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ABSTRACT
The resources of those who inhabit low-cost, low-quality
rental housing has declined over the last twenty-five years.
This, in combination with increased operating costs has
created a cash-flow crisis that has led many investors to
abandon their buildings or adapt them to other uses. This
crisis was partially and temporarily relieved by the use of
marginal sources of income and tax benefits outside the
traditional cash rent income stream. These new sources
encouraged a shift in the ownership patterns that, while
providing some short-term profitability, ultimately
accelerated the destruction of these rental units. This
case study of a building, its neighborhood and the
surrounding City of Holyoke, Massachusetts attempts to
illustrate this evolutionary process and its implications
for current residents.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Phillip Clay
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
CHAPTER I: Introduction
Homelessness, overcrowding, and unaffordable rents are an
expected part of our nations's urban landscape today. The
roots of this disaster in the economic and political changes
of the last quarter century are well-documented. What is
missing is an investigation into the social consequences of
these changes. The social effects on small property owners
are particularly important because they provide most of the
housing used by low-income households in this country. Why
investors choose to invest; where they invest; for how long;
who they choose to rent to; how they decide to make
improvements, raise rents, refinance, or sell a property are
not simple economic equations determined on a spread sheet.
What we will find in the case study that follows is a
complex set of relationships that is strongly affected, but
in no way determined, by the economic and political changes
that have given rise to a new set of social relations in the
operation and tenancy of low-income, low-quality rental
housing.
On January 21, 1991 the Springfield, Massachusetts
Morning Union newspaper published a list of landlords owing
taxes and sewer fees to the City of Holyoke, Massachusetts.
Fifty-one delinquent properties out of a tax list of some
10,000 parcels may not seem like a great many, but the
amount owed by landlords of apartment buildings was up more
than 300% from the previous year, from $19,000 to $72,000.
The Tax Collector, Terrence C. Ginley, believed the increase
was caused by "real estate speculators who came into the
market when it hit a peak (and now) are faced with a
declining cash flow and are having difficulty making
payments." Mr. Ginley wasn't too sympathetic, however. It
is "unconscionable that apartment owners would raise the
rents, take the profits during the rising market and not pay
when the income from the housing drops." Included in this
list of properties were 554-556 and 558 South Summer
Streets, owned by South East Summer Trust. This trust has
only one trustee, an investor who lists his address in an
upscale Boston suburb.
South Summer Street is located in a 200 acre section of
Holyoke known as South Holyoke, or Ward II. This is one of
the two areas often referred to as the "Lower Wards" (along
with Ward I, or "The Flats"). It contains much of the
city's original commercial district lining Main Street. It
also includes some factories and warehouses, a few parks,
several acres of vacant land, and a great many brick
apartment blocks built before the Depression. In 1980 92%
of the 1,073 rental units were found to be in buildings with
5 or more units. These apartment blocks, and the vacant
lots of those demolished, form the core of a residential
neighborhood covering 35 acres.
Turning the corner on Sargeant St. and driving north on
South Summer Street one is immediately struck by a series of
curious visual contrasts. Sections of the street and
sidewalk are virtually covered with litter piled into
alleyways, gutters and doorways while other parts have been
fastidiously swept clean. On the left side there is a
bright, new, two story, clapboard duplex with a fenced-in
yard standing a few feet away
building of blackened brick.
street forms a continous line
Sargeant Street down to the ne
has obviously undergone
including clean brick, new win
way. The entrance is flanked
yews. The building next door
building holds the offices
from a four story apartment
The right hand side of the
of four story buildings from
xt corner. The first in line
some recent rehabilitation,
dows, and a modern glass entry
by two planters with spreading
has also been fixed up. This
of Nueva Esperanza, Inc., a
community development corporation. The next two buildings
are 558 and 554-556 South Summer St.. The stone stairway
leading up to the second building has been reduced to a pile
of rubble. A plywood covered door stands ajar and a glimpse
inside reveals a grimy, unlit interior. The street itself
has recently been paved. Healthy, new trees rise out of
cuts into the new sidewalk at regular intervals.
Across the street from 558 South Summer street is 563
South Summer Street. Plywood covers the first floor windows
and several upstairs windows are broken. This building now
belongs to a subsidiary of the Bank of New England. They
bought it from the bank after a foreclosure auction failed
to bring an outside bidder. Prior to this, it was sold
three times between 1984 and 1987. Irene F. Lemire was a
tenant in the building for almost five decades prior to
1984. She "can't believe it, what can happen to a building
in just a year and a half." Her last landlord collected
rent for 24 years. When he sold the building in 1984 for
$4,000 per apartment he had no idea that the building would
sell for $12,500 per apartment the following year. Then two
years later the building sold again for $26,000 per unit.
At the time observers remarked that there was not enough
income such that repairs could be made and the debt service
paid off. "Someone will be stuck paying the bill", said
real estate developer Richard Courchesne. "We'll see some
foreclosures. The ultimate threat is demolition.""
In an age of expanding homelessness, demolition is a
serious threat. In a city whose downtown neighborhoods have
traditionally provided the poor working class with thousands
of inexpensive housing units, over half are now gone and
more disappear each year. This current threat is only the
most recent in a long history of deterioration. As a
nineteenth century industrial city built to exploit the
water power of the Connecticut River in Western
LTranscript-Telegram, "Flip side of the buying boom",
11/30/87.
Massachusetts, Holyoke's population peaked at 60,000 in the
1920's and has now declined to about 40,000.
Loss of economic advantage is, of course, a major part of
this story. Aging New England mill towns all suffer this
problem in one way or another. And, of course, many cities
like Holyoke have been weakened by their failure to adapt
successfully to the changing demands of modern
transportation, communications, distribution of services,
and uses of land. This changing political and economic
landscape has altered the shape of its low-grade rental
housing, as well. I use the term "low-grade" instead of
low-rent or low-income or low quality because it suggests
low quality for low rent without confirming that it is
either affordable or necessarily substandard, which might be
implied by these other adjectives. It denotes a class of
rental properties that lies at the bottom of the grading
scale and would typically be considered among the least
preferable apartment choices available. Focussing primarily
on the investment strategies of small owners of this low-
grade rental property (those with under 300 units), this
case study examines the evolution over time of an apartment
building, its neighborhood of South Holyoke and the larger
city surrounding it. Two major themes arise out of this
investigation:
Home Versus Investment
What becomes apparent throughout this history is the
tension between the uses of residential property as
investment or as shelter. Rental property is both a home
and a way to make money. These uses can complement or
contradict each other. A property may earn money without
providing decent shelter and vice versa; or it may do both
or neither. Without attempting to define an ideal balance,
one would certainly prefer a situation where earning money
is, at least in part, dependent upon the provision of decent
shelter. And yet we will find that the income-producing
elements of low-grade rental property investment have often
been divorced from the practice of providing shelter.
This should in no way reflect negatively on those who
have provided decent shelter and also made money. Those
investors skilled in the practice of providing shelter are
an important resource and deserve much (though perhaps not
always all) of their financial rewards. What is worthy of a
critical review is a system of financial rewards that
enables those with the least interest in providing shelter
(and sometimes the least capacity to do so) to reap the
greatest financial benefits.
Marginalization of Low-income Renter
Another important theme derives from the segregation by
income that has occurred in the post-war period. The
numbers of households at the bottom of the income scale has
increased during a time when zoning regulations and
escalating housing prices have raised the "price of
admission" to many suburban communities far beyond their
reach. Older, inner-city rental properties increasingly
offer the only remotely affordable shelter available to the
low-income household. As more affluent tenants move to
other markets, the average income of those who remain
declines. Buildings that must depend on the shrinking
resources of inner-city residents are likely to deteriorate,
further encouraging the flight of those able to do so, in an
escalating cycle.
As household incomes of inner-city residents become
proportionally smaller than those who live in the
surrounding communities, sharp economic divisions between
the haves and the have-nots create disturbing social and
political tensions. It becomes harder to imagine an
economically integrated community.
The efforts of city boosters to improve their city's tax
base and encourage private investment often lead them to
conclude that low-income households have little to offer.
They cite marketing studies that show potential middle-
income residents (The group they most want to attract.)
unwilling to move to what they consider to be low-income
neighborhoods. Further, they find that middle-income
households want to maximize their personal returns from
investments in property taxes. Communities that spend a
high proportion of their taxes on services for the poor are
considered poor investments. Finally, the demand for low-
skilled labor has shifted to the retail and services sectors
located away from the traditional, inner-city, low-income
neighborhoods. Hospitals and regional malls are not
dependent on a concentrated supply of low-skilled workers,
but rather recruit from a wide area, including part-time
homemakers and young workers still living at home with
parents.
When, on top of all of this, the residents of these low-
grade rental properties do not participate in the political
process, they may find that city leaders not only can afford
to ignore them, they are encouraged to find ways to displace
them, as well. Of course displacement is not extinction.
People don't disappear, they are simply pushed a little
further out of the way. Being pushed to the edges of
mainstream society, is what I mean by marginalization of the
low-income renter. It is an important housing issue because
it underlies the political discussion over land-use and
housing assistance programs. However, it is clear that this
issue cannot be approached without attention to the larger
questions of race, class, and social justice.
These two themes--"Home vs. Investment" and "The
Marginalization of the Low-Income Renter"-- will hopefully
bring into focus some of the important changes that rental
housing has undergone in Holyoke since the construction mill
worker housing almost a century ago--especially the most
dramatic changes which have occurred in the last twenty-five
years. For Holyoke these changes have been strongly shaped
by economic and political forces outside its boundaries.
But they are also the product of a unique local history and
of the actions of those who owned, managed and tenanted its
rental housing. These changes have confounded Holyoke's
residents and planners for decades. They have led to bitter
disputes, even to riots. They have challenged fundamental
notions of what housing should be, whom it should serve, and
who should be responsible for its fate. And most
fundamentally, they have combined to put scarce housing
resources for our most disadvantaged households at extreme
risk.
Following a further discussion of this theoretical
framework in Chapter 2, the thesis continues with the
history of Holyoke's nineteenth century mill worker
neighborhoods. Chapter 3 traces the shifting patterns of
investment, ownership and tenancy in HOlyokethat combined to
allow (or prevent) the provision of shelter from the 1840's
up to the 1960's. Chapter 4 then moves into a closer
examination of the last twenty-five years with particular
attention to the effects of changing conditions on the
decisions of those who own that housing. Those changing
conditions include: the local market; state and local
regulation; national housing and financial policies;
demographic shifts; and the national economy.
In Chapter 5 the paper traces those shifting conditions
through the history of 558 South Summer and how its various
owners used that property, ie: as an investment, a home, a
service to the community, etc. Indicators such as owner-
occupancy, capital improvements, equity investment,
refinancing, and resale in addition to management practices
such as tenant screening, turnovers, and rent increases will
hopefully reveal the landlord's overall use of the property.
The effect will be to show the individual investor facing an
array of choices and pressures and the decisions that
resulted.
In Chapter 6, we will look at the views of current
investors and the various ways that they are responding to
the current conditions. The variety of the responses should
provide us with some sense of the range of opportunities
available to policy makers. Using the historical analysis
as a reference point, Chapter 7 will suggest how policy-
makers might exploit these opportunities in the coming
years.
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CHAPTER 2: The Discussion in the Literature
Much has been written about housing affordability and the
lack thereof-- especially for our lowest income households.
This literature supports the argument that rental property
investors at the lower end of the market have been facing a
cash-flow squeeze that has forced many of them out of the
market entirely. Often this has meant the loss of the
housing units themselves. But the people remain and their
search for relatively inexpensive housing is unabated.
Recently, a new wave of investor has been able to respond to
this demand. They have bought, financed, and managed rental
properties to house these households. However, they have
done so in ways that has often threatened the long term
viability of that housing.
To help clarify these events it is useful to consider
them through two theoretical lenses. One, "The
Marginalization of the Low-Income Renter", reveals a long-
term trend in which property owners have not only lost
profits, but they have also lost touch with their tenants
and their shelter needs.
The second lense, the "Home vs. Shelter" conflict,
reveals another dissociative trend. As the new investors
sought to improve the profitability of their properties,
they looked to income-producing means that were only
marginally dependent on the provision of shelter. The
social contract between landlords and tenants that was
implied in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century
deteriorated markedly under these new investors. Instead of
depending on the satisfaction and long term tenancy of their
tenants, these new investors discovered that liberal debt
financing, generous subsidy programs, and lucrative tax
benefits were more important sources of income than their
impoverished tenants.
The following discussion is divided into these two
themes:
The Marqinalization of the Low-Income Renter
The most significant economic factor in this process has
been the spreading gap between what it costs to operate
rental housing and what the tenant has available to spend on
it-- The Affordability Gap.
The Affordability Gap
Perhaps one of the most often quoted documents of the
housing crisis in recent years has been A Decent Place to
Live: The Report of the National Housinq Task Force of March
1988.2 This report, alternatively called the Rouse
Commission Report has been credited for much of the impetus
2 National Housing Task Force, A Decent Place to Live,
(Washington: The Report of the National Housing Task Force,
1988).
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for the new federal Cranston-Gonzalez Affordable Housing Act
of 1990. This report points to a number of indicators of
housing problems faced by families in this country today.
Its principle finding was that increases in the costs of
housing were fast outstripping the growth in household
earnings used to pay those costs. While in 1982 the median
income of renters was $18,000 (1986 dollars), by 1986 it had
declined to $15,300, while those households with incomes
under $5,000 (1986 dollars) had nearly doubled. At the same
time rents grew substantially. The Task Force found that
approximately half of all renters were paying half of their
income for their rent, an increase of 2 million households
between 1974 and 1987. Single parent households found their
rent burden had increased from 35% in 1974 to 58% in 1987.
Another way to state this affordability gap is offered by
William Apgar. "Even adjusting for inflation, the number of
units renting for less than $300 per month dropped by nearly
one million between 1974 and 1983." "From 1983 to 1987,
the number of poverty-level renter households increased by
300,000 to 7.5 million." "
Ibid., pp.11-13.
"Apgar, William C., The Nation's Housing: A Review of Past
Trends and Future Prospects, (MIT Center for Real Estate
Development), p.37.
5 Ibid., p.29.
The reasons for the impoverishment of renters are not
central to this thesis. What is important to recognize is
that this condition is not simply the result of a recession
or a "downturn in the economy". This is a long-term
structural change that grows out of the way we organize our
economy and distribute the wealth that is created. Our
economy currently guarantees a large population of low-
income households who must use extraordinary means to afford
the least expensive housing. This has an important effect
on the investment choices of rental property owners who have
found that the rents they can charge are increasingly
limited by the shrinking income of their tenant households.
In traditional economic theory, if demand is greater than
supply, then prices should rise. Rising prices should
attract capital investment and expand supply to the point
where supply is in equilibrium with demand. Particularly
when discussing housing, demand has to be distinguished from
need. Just because people need and want housing, doesn't
mean that they can afford it. Demand is only the demand
which the buyer can afford to effect via cash. In the
current market, rising prices have not led to more
production as much as they have led to under-consumption
(ie: homelessness, overcrowding, and substandard
conditions).
Real Estate Research Corporation's Emerging Trends in
Real Estate 1990 reports their annual assessments of the
real estate industry's investment opportunities. In
analysing the residential market, the report finds a
significant cause for slowed growth in apartment demand:
"Most important, a high proportion of traditional renter
demand comes from households that can't afford to compete
for today's new, market-rate housing." They argue that
those apartments which are attracting investors are those
which serve the needs of "higher-profile renter households"
such as "affluent younger renter(s)", "empty nesters" and a
"growing class of moderate income" renter households. *
This failure to generate an effective demand may account
for the loss in the absolute number of housing units
previously available to renters at the lower end of the
market.' As tenants' ability to pay declines to the point
where they are unable to afford the minimum operating costs
of their housing, the owner of rental apartments at the
lowest end of the market is faced with the choice of pulling
out or trying to redirect his marketing to a different set
"Real Estate Research Corporation (RERC), Emerging Trends in
Real Estate: 1990, October, 1989.
One could argue that these are linked. It would seem
reasonable to assume that a decline in the absolute number of
low-rent rental units is linked with the increasing difficulty of
low-income renters to pay for their housing costs. After all,
why wouldn't landlords logically withdraw from such a problematic
market?
of potential tenants. The producers' response is to stop
producing units for those households. Observers noted that
between 1973 and 1983, 4.5 million units were removed from
the rental market through conversions or demolitions, half
of those estimated to be occupied by low-income households. a
Privately-owned, non-subsidized housing available and
affordable to low-income households is becoming a "vanishing
resource... (that) continues to be either lost to abandonment
or upgraded to serve higher income households."" Though the
homeless may lack housing for various reasons, independent
of their ability to pay the rent, the evidence that much of
the current homeless population is made up of families with
children and employed workers underlines the economic
sources of the homelessness problem.
Widening Social and Cultural Gaps
The marginalization of the low-income renter need not
refer only to the lack of the economic power needed to
demand a place in the mainstream of the community. Health,
"National Housing Task Force, p.12.
cApgar, William, "The Declining Supply of Low Cost Rental
Housing", Testimony presented to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee of
Housing and Urban Affairs," June 5, 1987. Cited in Keyes, Housinq
and the Homeless, 1988, p.7.
developmental, and social problems** experienced by the
homeless and those living in overcrowded, lead-painted,
poorly-heated, vermin-infested or otherwise substandard
housing are also perceived by the larger community as
indicators of some personal or social defect. Indeed, when
the inhabitants of such housing are of a different racial or
ethnic group, the defect is often attributed to that group.
The marginalization that is implied in the terms "inter-
generational poverty", "ghettoized" or "culture of poverty"
suggest social isolation and devaluation that may go well
beyond simple economic status.
Home vs. Investment
Marginal Profit-making
Although it is shrinking, there remains a housing market
for low-income households. Despite their increasing
difficulty finding adequate housing, many low-income renters
continue to do so. Much of those units are operated by
small rental property owners who have continued to find
financial opportunities in rental housing. In some cases,
it is housing that receives government subsidies. In many
more, it is housing where overcrowding (in order that
tenants can afford the rents) and low maintenance (in order
'Gove, Walter, Michael Hughes, and Omar Galle. 1979.
"Overcrowding in the Home: An Empirical Investigation of Possible
Pathological Consequences." American Sociological Review 44:59-
80.
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that landlords can maintain the cash flow) may make the
units temporarily affordable, but such abuses also guarantee
accelerated deterioration of the units.
Another means that has been especially significant in
recent years includes the use of outside income and other
benefits to substitute for the disappearing income stream.
This includes tax benefits (or most recently) cash from
lucrative loans provided by aggressive banks and thrifts.
The point here is that the simple business of offering
decent accomodations to low-income households in exchange
for a reasonable rent check is no longer profitable. Faced
with this challenge investors are discovering profit-making
opportunities on the "margins" of their rental property
investment. This change in the way of doing "business" has
had various (and often disastrous) implications for the
provision of decent, affordable rental housing. These
marginal profit-making opportunities include: speculative
inflation, debt-leveraging, and tax benefits.
Speculative Inflation
An investor analyzing the earnings potential of a
property partly bases his measure of return on expected
inflation: inflation of expenses, income, appreciation and
interest rates. The price he is willing to pay anticipates
the growth or decline in his net return over the holding
period. Buyers in the 1970's and 1980's were generally very
20
optimistic in their assessment of overall returns. These
anticipated returns caused buyers to bid up the properties
they were buying. These purchases were then financed by
banks that also anticipated appreciation in values and thus
felt assured that the amount of the loan would be covered by
the resale value of the property. These mortgages demanded
repayment schedules that significantly increased the
operating costs of the properties. Every resale of these
properties, especially during an inflationary period like
the 1970's, ratchets up the cost of housing another notch.
When a significant proportion of the return is derived
from the gain on the appreciation of the property, investors
must sell in order to realize that gain. As the speculation
intensifies the trading becomes almost like a game of
musical chairs with each new buyer eager to reap his
benefits before the music stops and values fall markedly.
Speculative turnovers were further encouraged by the
short depreciation schedules available before 1986.
Investors seeking to maximize their returns would rarely
hold their property beyond the depreciation period if there
was any possibility for sale. At a time when increases in
housing prices were reaching historic proportions, the
increased rate of turnovers due to short holding periods
only served to exacerbate the inflationary spiral.
The inflation of the '60's and '70's also led to banking
reforms that further contributed to this speculative cycle.
Debt Leveraging:
Banking Deregulation and the Credit Boom
Prior to the banking reforms of the Roosevelt
administration, most mortgage financing was provided by
small investors lending for short periods. In many cases
the seller provided a significant share of the financing.
The innovative housing finance programs of the New Deal not
only facilitated homeownership, but also increased the
availability and profitability of debt leveraging in the
rental market as well. One of those innovations was the
fixed-rate, long-term, level-payment, self-amortizing
mortgage. As inflation increased in the late 1960's, these
mortgages, over time, returned to the lenders an interest
rate less than the deposit rate after inflation L.L At the
same time the primary vehicle for these home mortgages, the
nation's savings banks, were constrained by regulators from
offering competitive interest rates to their depositors.
Neither were they able to invest in other potentially
lucrative deals, currently being used by those competing for
depositors' cash. When the crisis led to record losses
in 1981, the Congress moved to provide legislative relief.
The Depository Institutions Act of 1982 both provided new
"'This contributed still another source of income to the
investor. When interest on a mortgage was less than inflation,
the real, after-tax interest rate was often negative.
22
government aid and new flexibility in investment. It also
overruled state laws restricting "due-upon-sale" clauses,
allowing thrifts to "catch-up" with prevailing interest
rates each time a house was sold. The new flexibility
allowed a federal thrift to increase its assets in
commercial-type investments in several areas up to a total
of 90'4 of its total assets. This new competition moved the
savings bank industry out of its post-war era of turning
local depositors' savings deposits into home mortgages and
into a new high-stakes player in global capital markets.'2
In this competition for capital, another provision of the
new legislation made it easier for mutual savings banks to
convert to s
amass huge n
also began
that capital
in the thrif
the regulat
traditional
simultaneous
quickly. Fr
were eager
tock ownership. As the savings banks began to
ew sources of capital by issuing stock, they
to feel increasing pressure to earn income on
. Stockholders now became intensely interested
ts' ability to earn a high return on assets. As
ory doors were opened to all sorts of non-
investment opportunities, they were
ly under pressure to exploit those opportunities
om junk bonds to skyscrapers, the savings banks
to put their newfound capital quickly to work in
high earning investments.
2Meyerson, Ann, "Deregulation, Restructuring of Housing
Finance System", in Critical Perspectives on Housing,
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press) 1986.
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According to one banking source, this aggressive lending
attitude had a significant impact on the real estate market
in the mid 1980's. Lenders did not change their official
underwriting standards. Nor did they knowingly put their
depositors' money at increased risk. And yet, he admits,
loans were often made without anyone from the bank ever
visiting the property. "With the volume we were
experiencing, loan officers didn't have the time." Outside
appraisals were taken at face value. "Developers were
trusted", he says. "You have to remember that there had
been over 10 years of continuously appreciating real estate.
Many of these loan officers had never experienced a downturn
in the real estate market."3
Developers readily took advantage of this situation. With
sellers being offered unheard-of prices, they could afford
to take back a second mortgage for a fraction of the sale
price. The total of that mortgage plus what the bank had
loaned often exceeded the sale price. One Holyoke property
manager who assisted in dozens of real estate transactions
in the 1980's told me that a buyer rarely left the closing
table without some cash, in effect a negative down-payment.
A former banking commissioner writing about some of the more
egregious and, perhaps, criminal examples of this kind of
lending found that developers were able to obtain mortgages
"Interview with Roy Scott, 5/15/91.
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on properties for tens of thousands of dollars more than
their market value.""
The implications for property investment were quite
simple and quite disastrous. With this liberal lending
climate, it was possible for investors to purchase
properties (a) without any demonstrated capacity to manage
them, (b) with no financial risk to themselves if the
properties failed, and, (c) enough easy capital resources to
make these doomed investments on a grand scale, buying
hundreds of units at a time.
Tax Benefits
Tax benefits constitute the third major contribution to
rental profitability during a period of lagging rents.
These benefits, prior to 1986, took three forms: capital
gains exclusions, accelerated depreciation schedules, and
income sheltering.
(1) Up to 1986 60% of the gain on sale was excluded from
taxation. By 1988, however, capital gains were treated no
differently than other income. Capital gains exclusions, by
enhancing the value of the income from the eventual sale of
the property, enabled investors, in an appreciating market,
to forego operating income and still maintain a reasonable
return on income.
Focer, Ada, "The Great Bank Robbery", in New England
Business, March 1991.
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(2) The depreciation of a capital asset can be accounted
for as a business expense to offset taxable income. The
federal government has attempted in the past to spur
investment in housing by offering accelerated depreciation
rates for residential properties. In 1960, that
acceleration was further enhanced, cutting the straight-line
depreciation period to one half its previous rate. Although
this rate was lengthened in successive years, it was still
considered a significant benefit until the 1986 reforms when
residential properties were increased to 27.5 years with no
acceleration options available.'"
(3) Prior to 1986 it was possible to offset one's income
from one source by applying losses taken from any other
source, often real estate. Doctors, lawyers and other high-
income professionals could effectively "shelter" their
income by investing in properties that lost money (on
paper). The new tax law significantly restricts such
activity. However, in the past, the paper losses engendered
by acclerated depreciation schedules and large mortgage
interest payments made real estate a particularly attractive
investment. Those seeking tax shelters were rarely
interested in the actual operation of their properties.
"It should also be noted that accelerated depreciation
schedules increase the likelihood of short ownership periods. As
owners "use up" this tax benefit more quickly, their financial
incentive to hold on to their property is proportionally reduced.
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They often had little knowledge of the building, its
tenancy, or even its location.
These marginal sources of income: speculative inflation,
debt leveraging, and tax benefits allowed rental properties
to generate income where that might otherwise have been
impossible. Although this contributed to many successful
developments, the overall effect in many areas was to shift
the attention of the investor away from the business of
providing physical shelter for his tenants and instead to
the business of providing income shelters to his partners.
Intimate knowledge of one's property and tenants, a tough
hand with the budget, and a commitment to the long-term
viability of the property and the surrounding neighborhood
were no longer the key elements in this new investor
strategy. The new strategy depended, instead, on a
knowledge of loan underwriting requirements, tax laws,
market trends and access to wealthy investors seeking to
shelter their income. The old strategy was not profitable
and those who used it soon gave way to the new investors who
were able to offer high prices based on their enhanced use
of these marginal income sources.
The reforms of 1986 and the crash in the real estate
market soon after has removed most of these marginal
incentives. As these new investors are forced to return to
traditional investment strategies they are finding that the
legacy of deferred maintenance and high debt service
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payments is more than these properties can bear. The
traditional investment strategy may not have been working
well, but the new solution has proved even worse. Not only
are these properties financially untenable, but a generation
of investors who might have held on for a little longer have
all disappeared and their replacements seem ill-prepared for
the return to the difficult and unrewarding job of managing
low-grade rental property.
Marginal Versus Rent-Driven Profit-Making
I believe the term "marginal profit-making" to be useful
because it makes an important distinction in the way an
investor earns income from the use of his property.
This method is contrasted with the more traditional
method which I call "rent-driven". The rent-driven landlord
is dependent for his income from the rent, either as
collected every month or as capitalized by a buyer at the
time of sale. In this example, the landlord can only earn
income so long as people are willing to pay a rent that is
greater than the costs of operating the building. This
basic strategy is "rent-driven", because it relies on the
cash income from rents. Ideally, when this works, it is a
self-sustaining strategy that ensures a long life for the
building and a prosperous return to the investor.
What the findings below will show is that, as the net
operating income from rents declined over the last twenty
28
years, there was a period when the traditional rent-driven
landlord was supplanted by those using these "marginal"
sources. Increasingly complex rules of finance, expanding
tenant rights and increasingly vigorous health and safety
regulations put the traditional small property owner at a
decided disadvantage. As these owners failed or sold out to
financially sophisticated buyers, the composition of the
rental property-owning community shifted from local owners
with a relatively intimate knowledge of their properties
toward outside investors, some of whom never saw their
buildings and even refused to visit them.
Declining Commitment to Public Housing
As the private market was discovering that the most
profitable uses of low-grade rental property had little to
do with fulfilling the needs of low-income tenants; as small
investors were deciding either to abandon the property,
upgrade it, or use it for the marginal benefits described
above; as the private sector was making choices that would
ultimately reduce the supply of low-income housing for years
to come, public action was sorely needed. Nationally,
however, the trend has not been to increase the public
commitment to subsidized housing, but rather the opposite.
For many low-income households, the availability of
federally-subsidized housing assistance over the last fifty
years has been an equalizer. Despite significant failures,
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public housing assistance has given millions of
disadvantaged households a badly needed opportunity to live
in decent, safe, affordable housing. Perhaps predictably,
the initial generosity of federal housing programs peaked in
the early 1970's and has now waned for almost twenty years.
Following a brief resurgence during the Carter years. the
Reagan administration sharply applied the brakes beginning
in the first term.
"Since 1980, (federal) housing assistance has been
slashed by 73 percent ... from $33 billion to $9
billion, the largest cut of any domestic program
Chester Hartmann's 1986 piece in Critical Perspectives in
Housinq cites three elements of the Reagan administration's
attack:
1. Termination of existing new construction programs
for lower-income households.
2. Sloughing off existing lower-income housing
developments through deterioration, demolition, or
sale.
3. Extracting ever larger portions of lower-income
households' budgets as a price for getting federally-
subsidized housing (increased from 25% to 30%).
Dreier, Peter and John Atlas, "Mansion Subsidy Revisited",
Shelterforce, May/June 1991.
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He goes on to cite the steady decline in HUD's lower
income housing starts with 183,000 units in 1980 to only
28,000 in 1985. He lists cuts in the Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) program, cuts to existing public housing
operating subsidies and modernization expenditures and cuts
to other housing-related programs.
This dramatic decline goes beyond the demands of any new
austerity that might be demanded in a period of low economic
growth. Even ignoring increased spending in other areas
(ie: military programs) or wasteful spending (ie: the Pierce
scandals), it is clear that the Reagan administration made
deliberate political decisions to get government out of the
business of increasing housing opportunities for low-income
households. The new Bush administration has done little to
reverse that trend.
I would argue that these policies have further
contributed to the marginalization of the low-income
household and the small property owner who has traditionally
provided their housing. The loss of housing units that
might have been built during a period of growing demand
surely contributed to the tight market that pushed people
out onto the streets. The cumulative effects of years of
living in substandard units where most of the household
budget went to pay exorbitant rents must have reduced the
life chances of many of our nation's children. The
deterioration of public housing from underfunding has
certainly contributed to the public perception that public
housing is fundamentally impractical and that those who live
in it are unworthy of public support.
The declining resources of those who inhabit low-grade
rental housing in the post-war era has created a cash-flow
crisis for investors that has led many owners to abandon
their buildings or adapt them to other uses. This crisis
was partially and temporarily relieved by the use of
marginal sources of income and tax benefits. However, these
new sources encouraged a shift in the ownership patterns
that, while providing some short term profitability,
ultimately accelerated the destruction of these rental
units.
Although the existing literature emphasizes the economic
effects on rental housing and its tenants, the social
effects have also been powerful. The traditional small
rental property owner, able to make a decent living through
the provision of a socially acceptable service (ie: housing
low-income households), is threatened with extinction.
Neighborhood residents experience that loss as isolation,
powerlessness, and the loss of neighborhood identity and
mutual accountability. This should sound familiar to those
familiar with community-based groups, whose attention to
these abstract social problems is often as strong as their
support for improved housing and city services. Planners
might do well to consider the importance of these social
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effects as they attempt to "rehabilitate" neighborhoods with
shiny, new buildings and larger, more distant investors.
Before we examine the post-war period more closely I
believe it is important to establish the historical roots of
the neighborhood of South Holyoke and the forces which
shaped it. That history provides the present with both
physical and abstract legacies that cannot be ignored: (1) a
built environment that must be accomodated-- even its
demolition must be accounted for; (2) a way of doing things
that presupposes what can and cannot, should and should not,
be done-- traditions that have summarized a complex
evolution of interpersonal exchanges into a simpler set of
social norms and cannot be easily reinvented. The origins
of the buildings of South Holyoke and the traditional ways
that they have been used is covered in the next chapter.
Methods and Data
The sources for the information in this case study come
from three sources. The first is the author's personal
experience as a property manager in South Holyoke for four
years; as a member of the Greater Holyoke Rental Housing
Association; and as an owner of rental housing.
The second source is a series of interviews with small
rental property investors, property managers, lawyers,
housing advocates and bankers both during the Summer of 1990
and the Spring of 1991. For most of these interviews,
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confidentiality was a pre-condition and therefore few
quotations are attributed. Interviews with six investors--
each holding investments in rental properties totalling less
than 300 units -- were conducted. Investors were asked to
discuss how they decided to invest in rental properties,
what changes they had seen in the regulation, financing and
profitability of their properties over the years, and what
they saw for the future.
The remaining information was culled from published and
unpublished reports, Census data, newspaper clippings and
the files of the Holyoke Planning Department.
I had hoped to be able to have available the exact
financial records of investors for the purposes of explicit
analysis. The reluctance of investors and the confused
nature of their bookkeeping combined to make this impossible
for this report. However, after having concluded this
research, I am more convinced of the usefulness of more
detailed financial analysis and would encourage further
attempts to do such an analysis.
CHAPTER 3: The Early History of Holyoke's Low-Grade Rental
Housing, 1846 - 1965
Introduction
Most of the apartment buildings of South Holyoke were
built around the turn of the century. Their size,
configuration, placement and density were primarily designed
to house the millworkers and their families. The original
plan was to provide a large supply of inexpensive units
within an easy walk of the surrounding manufacturing mills.
The subsequent loss of local manufacturing jobs ' and the
increased use of the automobile for commuting has seriously
challenged the underlying premise for this plan. Local
observers report that few of South Holyoke's residents
continue to walk to work, today. Nevertheless, the
buildings remain. And, regardless of the changing economy,
people have continued to buy them and make use of them-- for
both shelter and profit.
Comparing these investors and their investment
strategies, we will note how, at times, their efforts seem
to promote the long term capacity of these buildings to
provide shelter. Furthermore, we will see how the owners of
these buildings may have even nurtured a self-sustaining
Between 1970 and 1988 the Census Bureau and the
Massachustetts Department of Employment Security reported a total
of nearly 4,000 manufacturing jobs lost in Holyoke.
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community. At other times those interests have been
destructive of these buildings and the neighborhoods that
they comprise. Understanding how a building in one period
can "work" to provide a sustaining and sustainable shelter
and in another period can become useless or even dangerous
can provide important clues to setting public policies
designed to promote the former condition and avoid the
latter.
In this chapter we examine the evolution of Holyoke's
mill worker housing from its original conception and
construction through World War II up to 1965.
Sheltering the Mill Worker: Landlord As Mill Owner
From its very beginnings, this industrial city on the
shores of the Connecticut River has been plagued with a
"housing problem". When a group of Boston industrialists
formed The Hadley Falls Company in 1846 and bought 1200
acres of land to build an entire city at the site of the 57
foot Hadley Falls, the attraction of cheap and plentiful
hydraulic power" was expected to draw manufacturers from
all over New England. With a massive dam to capture the
water and direct into canals, mills were to be located so
that water from the upper canals would flow through the
MWater power charged to mills at the rate of
$4.62/horsepower in 1887 while steamcost at least $19.89/
horsepower. From Holyoke City Directory, 1887.
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mills to the canal below and so on to the river. Original
drawings showed 25 cotton mills located along the canals.
Attracting labor was not expected to be a problem. Most
of the construction and mill work was low-skilled and Irish
immigrants had begun flocking to the States as conditions
worsened in Ireland in the 1840's. To plan for an adequate
supply of housing for the workers in the anticipated mills,
the owners set aside parcels of land immediately adjoining
the mill sites to be used for housing the workers for that
particular mill.
In this early period the use of housing as a means for
earning income was directly tied to the supply of labor for
the local factories. The purpose of housing was to shelter
workers in order that their work might provide income to the
mill owner. Housing was not seen, as yet, as a profitable
commodity in and of itself. During this period mill wages
for most workers were "little more than enough to live on".
The average wage at the Lyman Mills in 1871 was $3.24 per
week with board costing an average of $3.00 per week in the
company boarding houses23 With so little disposable
income, the investor with capital at this point would have
*"Green, Constance McLaughlin, Holyoke, Massachusetts: A
Case Hisotry of the Industrial Revolution in America, Archon
Books, 1968.
-Green, p.105
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found comparatively little reward for his investment in the
production and rental of housing for these workers.
"Cornering" the Land Market
The lack of transportation and the location of the city
in the crook of a major river with no bridges, made
alternative housing sites scarce. The owners refused to
allow other available land in this "corner" of the western
shore to be used for housing. They felt that the highest
and best use for the land was manufacturing mills, which
they felt sure would flock to the City.
In 1855 there were only 514 dwellings to accomodate 778
families. In the neighboring city of Chicopee,
townspeople pointed out that small, comfortable houses were
common while Holyoke offered only brick blocks three and
four stories high and the rent for apartments in such places
was higher than any surrounding town. One observer reported
in the local paper that the owners, instead of hoping to
capitalize on the anticipated boom, should instead seek to
"create an attractive manufacturing village"22 For those
who were unable to find housing in the available tenements,
the other option was to build a shanty along the shores of
the river.
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2LGreen, p.41.
2Green, p. 41.
Squatting on the land, the newly arrived poor Irish dug
out a hole, put up a few boards and built a one-room,
windowless shelter. When it was possible to move on to
better accomodations, another newcomer often moved in.
These neighbors, living in what was called the "Patch",
often worked together building shelters, collecting
firewood, sharing the few water pumps and baking ovens
available. This historical sidelight provides an
interesting example of ethnic and community-based self-help
in the face of mainstream neglect that may have implications
for Holyoke's most recent newcomers.
Many of the townspeople blamed the housing shortage on
the Company's directors who still owned all the developable
land. These landowners had opposed the construction of a
bridge to the neighboring South Hadley and restricted the
use of their land for housing development, preferring
overcrowding to lowering real estate values.
Crisis and Accomodation:
The Rise of the Independent Investor and the Owner-
Occupant
When cotton mills failed to flourish, paper mills were
introduced with great success. A new railroad and new
commercial banks aided the overall economic expansion.
Growing employment contributed to an increasing demand for
housing. Though the mills often provided housing for their
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mill hands, there was not enough housing for these workers'
households, much less for those of the laborers, clerks,
merchants and others. In 1866 public health officials found
a block with 105 people living in 17 rooms, some with 10
people in one room alone2 Health officials continued to
find appalling conditions in Holyoke, even for those times,
and found infant mortality rates, death rates, and
residents/room occupancy ratios that rivalled the worst in
the nation.
But the political complexion of the town was changing.
The new paper mill owners were often local businessmen
involved in the life of the community as opposed to the
absentee owners of the cotton mills, derisively called "the
cotton lords". The wage scale in the paper mills was higher
than that for cotton. Industrial growth fed the building
industry, including contractors, lumberyards, sawmills and
brickyards. They, in turn, sought orders for new
residential construction. Combined with the rising earnings
of Holyoke millworkers (among the highest in the state), the
demand for new housing opportunities for Holyoke's workers
could no longer be ignored by the Company's successor, the
Holyoke Water Power Company.
In the 1870's their policies were relaxed somewhat. In
1872, a bridge was built to South Hadley. In 1873, the
Green, p.116.
company stopped requiring that housing sites be developed
only in conjunction with specific mills. Land was more
easily bought by small investors, who constructed apartment
buildings in which they often occupied one of the units.24
The Die Is Cast
By 1923, the downtown development of Holyoke had peaked.
Built around a manufacturing center that required thousands
of inexpensive housing units within easy walking distance
while occupying the least amount of space necessary, its
neighborhoods were filled with densely constructed tenements
with few amenities. For many years Holyoke's occupancy
ratio was higher than any city in Massachusetts, except
Boston. In 1880 it was 10.52 per dwelling, in 1900 it was
10.9 per unit, in 1910 it was 11.9. In South Holyoke, the
ratio was 22.3 per dwelling unit in 1915.
"Tigertown", as South Holyoke was called originally, was
known for its rough character. It was a neighborhood whose
rental units were available to those with the least
resources for the lowest rents. That status, of being on
the lowest rung of the ladder, has remained virtually
unchanged to this day. What has changed so dramatically,
particularly in recent years, is the gap between the rungs
on that ladder. The earlier residents of South Holyoke may
24Green, 172.
have been poor, but they were only slightly less so than
most of the other immigrant 2nfamilies who made up over 75".
of the City's population in 1920.
The ethnic construction of Holyoke's society was
established as well by the 1920's. With the new immigration
restrictions of that decade there were no new waves of
ethnic groups to disrupt the social fabric of linguistic and
cultural enclaves.
Industrial Stagnation
Holyoke's main advantage as an industrial center, hydro-
power, was diminished with the advent of electrical
generation. Local power stations on the river were eager to
sell their power to any manufacturer anywhere. Though
delayed by the temporary increase in demand for goods in the
first World War, by 1922 it was clear that Holyoke had
peaked as a manufacturing center. As manufacturing firms
closed their doors and thousands of workers were laid off,
the population began to decline. World War II provided some
relief but the trend reappeared in the 50's and continued,
slow but steady, through the 60's. From its estimated
height in 1923 of 63,094 the population fell to 53,065 in
2sNon-native born plus native born of foreign parents.
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1960. The number of wage earners in Holyoke's factories in
1957 was 65". of its 1923 peak.24
The Consolidation of a Neighborhood
Those familiar with South Holyoke during the period
following the Depression often describe it as a strong,
diverse and stable neighborhood. They remember the variety
of shops along every street, the churches and meeting halls
which residents widely attended, and especially the extended
tenures of residents. The sense was that people rarely
wanted to move away. Households living in the same building
for twenty years were not considered uncommon. With church,
school, family, friends, work and stores all located within
easy walking distance, there was a strong incentive for
families to stay as long as possible where they lived.
Landlords rarely advertised in the paper.
It was a common practice for an apartment to be "spoken
for" some time in advance of a vacancy as existing tenants
made arrangements for family and friends to move into the
next vacant apartment. This practice was supported by the
strong demand for rental units following the Depression,
especially during WWII, when soldiers stationed at Westover
Air Force Base often lived in apartments in the
neighborhood.
"Saunders, M.O., Master Plan Report, (Holyoke: Holyoke
Planning Board), 1961.
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The ethnic and religious groups that had established
their own neighborhood enclaves found little to disturb
their status quo. By the 1950's the Irish/French-Canadian
rivalry had long subsided. South Holyoke's Irish residents
no longer dominated it by the 1950's. The French Canadians,
however, remained within easy walking distance of the local
French-language parish church. They outnumbered the next
largest ethnic group by 7 to i. Aside from a handful of
southern African-Americans (3.5'4 of total), there were few
challenges to this ethnic balance in Holyoke's traditional
"gateway" neighborhood. Throughout the City as a whole, the
number of census respondents who reported themselves to be
foreign born in 1950 was less than half what it had been in
1910 when it was nearly half the population.
The result was a close knit social structure within the
individual buildings and throughout the neighborhood.
Tenants were obligated to pay the rent and landlords were
obligated to fix what broke, but that was only a small part
of the relationship. Children were cared for by neighbors,
whether landlord or tenant. The sick and elderly could
depend on healthy neighbors to run errands, purchase
groceries and provide transportation.
The Owner As Occupant
The predominance of the owner-occupant in apartment
buildings is hard to document. However, the most recent
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publishers of the Holyoke City Directory began in the 1930's
to indicate when a resident reported that they or someone in
the household was also an owner. This rough accounting
should afford us with some sense of the trend, at least.
Simply counting those addresses with more than one unit on
just one street in South Holyoke (South East Street), I
found that 11 out of the 28 apartment buildings listed had
an owner-occupant in 1935. This increased to 14 in 1940 and
returned to 11 in 1950. However, by 1960, that number had
dropped to only 5. In 1980 there were only 3 in the 18
apartment buildings still listed. 2
We will see in the example of 558 South Summer Street
that the range of relationships was not simply limited to
either owner-occupant or absentee landlord. Like 558 South
Summer St. buildings often held relatives of the owner as
tenants. This, however, becomes less likely as the economic
status and ethnicity of the owner and tenant population
diverge. Although there appears to be no easy way to
document this "owner-occupancy, once-removed", or its
evolution over time, I can relate some examples from
personal experience.
I personally was involved in the purchase of eleven
occupied buildings in South Holyoke in the mid 1980's. Only
two included relatives as tenants. In one building the
2'The Price and Lee Company, Holyoke South Hadley Directory,
New Haven, CT.
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owner's father-in-law had lived for many years, though
recently his children had been trying to get him to move
out. In another case, it was the young children and their
families who occupied the building. In both these cases the
owner had bought the buildings many years ago. Only one of
the investors I interviewed still maintains this practice
and she has been doing this for almost 30 years.
Maintaining "a good building", for the owner-occupant,
does not always correspond with a good return on investment.
Landlords were constrained from raising rents often by their
own friendships with tenants. Their "investment" was not
only in the financial dollars that paid for the
construction, operation and their profit, it was also an
investment in the structure of social relationships which
became as life-sustaining as the flow of rental dollars.
The Suburbs: The Shift to Homeownership
After World War II, the decline in Holyoke's population
exceeded the loss of jobs. The authors of a 1961 study of
Holyoke blamed the decline in population on the movement to
the suburbs. Their report speculates that the population of
Holyoke was likely to be "unusually mobile" due to the large
numbers of single person households and multifamily housing
with "a large amount of tenancy" as opposed to
homeownership. The report suggests that if more Holyokers
owned their own homes, they would be less likely to seek
those opportunities elsewhere.2B
The implications of this recommendation for a densely
urban neighborhood are not encouraging. Prior to the advent
of the automobile suburb, Holyoke's downtown neighborhoods
were considered by many to have been strong, vital places in
which to live. With the car, its highways, and the
expanded homeownership opportunities of the suburbs, inner
city rental tenure was losing its appeal to those with the
resources to move out. Providing homeownership
opportunities in aging 8-unit brick tenements was not what
these advisors recommended. Consonant with much of the
popular wisdom of the Urban Renewal era, these advisors
found South Holyoke's housing to be outmoded and they
recommended turning South Holyoke into an industrial park.
Others refuted this line of thinking, preferring to
emphasize the traditional values of the urban neighborhood
and the importance of inexpensive rental housing to both the
residents and local industry. Nevertheless, the trend was
unmistakeable.
In an age of automobiles, the value of proximity had
declined. In an escalating spiral, bus ridership losses led
to cuts in bus service. Cars choked the streets. Building
permit records indicate that landlords had begun (beginning
""Holyoke, City of, Master Plan Report, 1961.
47
as early as the 1920's) to fill their tiny backyards with
garages and parking areas. Convenience was turning to
annoyance and the suburbs were the escape.
But even as the most affluent of Holyoke's inner-city
residents began to buy new homes in the surrounding
farmlands, the immediate post-war demand for rental
apartments remained high. As returning soldiers created new
households, rental apartments offered them an opportunity to
live inexpensively and it often took many years to save
enough for a down payment. However, by 1955, the rate of
decline in the mill-worker neighborhoods was higher than
ever.
Aging in Place
By 1955, these neighborhoods had lost over 20% of their
peak populations. Census reports in 1960 indicated that
those wards were continuing to lose population in greater
numbers than other neighborhoods. However it is not simply
the case that people moved away. Some did. These same
census reports indicate that the household size decreased
while the median age increased. This aging neighborhood was
attracting fewer new families with children and,
increasingly, consisted in older and smaller households.
The post war years in South Holyoke are often remembered
with fondness by the previous residents. It is ironic that,
even as it was undergoing profound, if at times slow,
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change, the neighborhood's post-war image of stability and
order remains a strong memory to this day. The squalor of
the industrial boom era had been reduced by health and
sanitation improvements. The crushing overcrowding had been
eased by the exodus of jobs and workers and the decreasing
proportions of families with large numbers of children.
Storekeepers still lived in an apartment behind their shop.
Lawyers, doctors, and professionals still could be found
living with their families next door to mill-hands and day-
laborers. Economic stagnation had reduced the demand for
foreign labor and ethnic conflicts, though by no means
eliminated, were less prominent. But even as this image was
being formed, the foundations on which it was built were
being destroyed.
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CHAPTER 4: THE LAST 25 YEARS
Introduction
The environment for small rental property owners in
Holyoke over the last twenty-five years has been shaped by
several factors. The loss of manufacturing jobs, the
decline in median household income, the recent wave of
Puerto Rican immigration, banking reforms, declining federal
commitment to housing and social programs, expansion of non-
project-based, deep rental subsidies, local efforts at urban
renewal, expanding tenants' rights and increasing owner
liability for tenant damages from discrimination to lead
poisoning, all led to significant changes in the nature of
rental housing in South Holyoke between 1965 and 1990.
Accelerating Decline--Fewer and Poorer Residents
Vacancies increased tenfold during the 1950's and
continued to swell through the 60's. As the skilled workers
left for better jobs and/or suburban communities, there were
fewer and fewer new households willing to set up a home in
the neighborhood. The traditional closed system of filling
vacancies--word of mouth and personal referrals-- failed to
work adequately to fill the units.
Those who remained represented those with fewer choices,
the less wealthy. In keeping with the "filtering" model of
neighborhood change, the aging of neighborhood housing
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paralleled the decline in income of its residents. In 1960
South Holyoke's family median income stood at 85% of the
citywide median. By 1970 it had fallen to 61%. In 1980 it
fell still further to 41%. Population fell in the
neighborhood by 26% during this decade, almost twice the
rate for the city overall. With household formation in the
1960's at its lowest ebb, fewer and fewer job opportunities
in the city, an aging housing stock that was increasingly
outmoded by newly constructed housing in the suburbs, and an
aging class of property owners who were beginning to abandon
their properties for lack of a new generation of buyers,
South Holyoke was increasingly perceived as an unviable
residential neighborhood. And yet most of the original
housing was still standing in 1970-- filled with vacancies,
but standing.
New Immigrants Fill the Vacuum
Nineteen sixty-five marks for many the turning point in
the post-war history of Holyoke. In this year the flow of
Hispanic immigrants introduced them as a major new ethnic
group in Holyoke. Their arrival was due to many causes.
The high unemployment rate in Puerto Rico, and the massive
displacement caused by urban renewal in other urban areas
like the South Bronx are cited as "Push" factors for this
migration. "Pull" factors include farmworker recruitment
and the opportunity to live in cheap housing within a five
minute ride of farmlands, fishing, and fresh water beaches.
More specifically, the urban redevelopment that hit the
North End of Springfield (less than 15 miles to the South)
in the mid 60's displaced many Puerto Rican families.
They found that South Holyoke held a ready and affordable
supply of substitute housing and the number of Hispanics in
South Holyoke grew from 287 in 1970 to 1,879 in 1980.
What they did not find in Holyoke was a stable and
expanding source of employment. The agricultural and
manufacturing employment that had been their primary sources
of income were also the region's most rapidly declining
sectors. What jobs they were able to find were not well
paid. By 1979 seventy-six percent of all Hispanic workers
in the Springfield-Holyoke-Chicopee Labor Market Area worked
in janitor or cleaner jobs. They held 90% of all such
jobs. *
Holyoke's low-grade rental housing may have been
considered unviable for many of the working class with
expanding incomes and rising expectations. For those whose
incomes had not kept pace, who were finding fewer and fewer
apartments that they could afford, Holyoke's housing was an
opportunity to at least find a place to live and hope that
decent employment would follow. For whatever reason,
2'Leveille, Karen, "South Holyoke Housing Development Plan",
1985.
*Massachusetts Division of Employment Security, Analysis of
Employment Trends: Hampden County Service Delivery Area, 1989.
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Holyoke's housing vacuum was beginning to fill with the most
economically depressed ethnic groups identified at that
time.
For investors seeking opportunities in the low-grade
rental housing market, these changes did have some rewards.
But it would be hard to appreciate the changes in the market
without first discussing the role of the local government.
The City Intervenes:
Disinvestment, Demolition and Displacement
Disinvestment. The 1968 Master Plan for the City of
Holyoke observed South Holyoke's rising vacancy rates and
abandonment and argued that, "As the standards of living for
Holyoke's industrial workers continues to rise many old and
obsolete multiple dwelling structures will be abandoned." *'
Therefore, they argued, South Holyoke should be eliminated
as a residential neighborhood, demolishing the old buildings
to make room for increased industrial use.
Community activists were successful in challenging the
Master Plan and halting the elimination of South Holyoke as
a residential neighborhood. However, the City chose to
ignore recommendations that might have prevented further
deterioration. Instead its actions convinced many that it
*z Holyoke, City of, Master Plan: City of Holyoke, prepared
by Candeub, Fleissig and Associates, 1968.
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was attempting to do through neglect what it had failed to
do by plan. South Holyoke as a neighborhood simply had no
"official" future. Bankers, responding with predictable
caution, withdrew the credit that investors sought to make
building improvements. Meanwhile the City's housing
demolition in The Flats added to South Holyoke's problems.
The Flats is another millworker neighborhood just north of
South Holyoke. Together they are sometimes referred to as
"The Lower Wards".
Demolition. Official neglect of South Holyoke in the
face of escalating deterioration was not the only
destabilizing influence imposed by the City. As noted
above, the 1961 Master Plan for the City recommended that
South Holyoke and The Flats be transformed into industrial
areas. With their abandoned, vacant buildings these
neighborhoods were choice targets for the urban renewal
programs that had come into prominence.
The 1968 Master Plan for The Flats was to reduce the
population density of the neighborhood while removing
substandard housing. The City's designated developer for
The Flats destroyed many recently occupied units with
typically only two units being constructed for every eight
units torn down. Between 1970 and 1980 The Flats lost 41%
of its total housing units, 50% of its rental units.
Displacement. Displaced tenants from The Flats began to
crowd into South Holyoke, where the conflagration peaked in
August of 1981 with a fire that claimed seven lives and
captured the attention of the nation. Holyoke's astounding
fire statistics won it the label, "Arson City". Resistance
to the establishment of an arson squad; understaffing of the
fire department; an aggressive condemnation and demolition
effort in minority neighborhoods combined with their efforts
against the establishment of emergency housing shelters
convinced many that Holyoke's leaders were at war with their
poor minorities.=" Despite the firefighters' union's
successful lawsuit against the city (where it finally won
funding for a full-time arson squad), by 1985 there were
still standing in South Holyoke only one half the units
recorded in 1970 and not one new unit built in all that
time.
From Obsolete Buildings to Obsolete People
It is hard in this era of declining expectations to
appreciate the confidence in economic progress reflected in
the planning documents of the 1960's. With hindsight we can
see how the City's planners' predictions of employment and
population growth largely overshot the actual growth. But
perhaps, at the time, there was some justification for their
conviction that the City's "older housing units.. .are
Harden, Tom, "Uphill All the Way: The Potential of
Community-Based Development in South Holyoke", Master's Thesis,
Tufts, 1986, p.80.
55
difficult to maintain and upgrade" and should be "phased
out". In the bright new future people simply would not
accept such living conditions. The time had come, they
believed, to clear the dead wood and make room for the new
growth of modern industry and housing. However, for South
Holyoke this meant razing the entire neighborhood. Those
who lived in South Holyoke felt personally threatened by
these plans and they fought hard to save their homes and
their neighborhoods.
During the 1970's the rhetoric of progress changed. By
1983, the President of the Board of Aldermen was calling for
the refusal a moratorium on new housing subsidies for the
City, "Because chronic poverty also implies an unskilled
labor force, it deters high-technology industries from
settling in Holyoke.'" This public explanation for the
refusal of housing subsidies was used less publicly to
justify the elimination of a much larger source of housing
for these households, ie: the unsubsidized low-grade rental
housing stock. "Cleaning out the dead wood" had taken on
new meaning.
Who Would Buy a Building in Such A Neighborhood?:
Investors Respond
Harden, p.66.
For those property owners who could keep up their
buildings and avoid condemnation, the elimination of the
cheaper competition was a boost to business. Vacancies that
had been steadily rising in previous decades fell
dramatically during the 1970's. In The Flats, they were
reduced by 66%, in South Holyoke, by 24%.
For competent investors in low-grade rental housing in
Holyoke during the 1970's this combination of shrinking
supply and expanding demand could bring rewards. Landlords
who could pick up distressed, but salvageable properties and
manage them through the storms of arson, redlining,
expanding legal protections for tenants and ethnic tensions
found that the new immigrants were willing to pay much
higher rents for their units than the native and primarily
elderly residents many of whom had paid the same rent for
many years. While sellers often based their asking prices
on the existing cash flows, enterprising buyers realized
that these older tenants would soon be moving on and the new
rents would enhance the value of the property. "One thing
you could say about these new speculators," commented one
housing advocate, "They rarely discriminated. They would
rent to anybody." The result was that South Holyoke's
median gross rents increased by 144% during this decade, the
largest gain of any neighborhood in the City.
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The Squeeze: Taking More From the Tenants and the
Buildings
During that same period, however, family incomes in South
Holyoke increased only 21%. Landlords were fueling rent
increases, not with more affluent tenants but with more
desperate ones, ones willing to pay a very large share of
their income for a housing opportunity. In this case the
improved financial viability of the rental housing did not
guarantee either financial success or a decent sheltering
environment. It would be an understatement to say that such
changes were destabilizing. Overcrowding and all the
attendant social problems of people living close to the edge
were causing serious problems. Maintenance costs were
becoming more difficult to control and the "fragile"
conditions of these 60-80 year old buildings required more
than the "subsistence diet of repairs" that they were
receiving.
Building Inspectors reported that, generally, owners of
low-grade rental properties increasingly seemed to be
waiting to be ordered to make repairs, rarely doing so on
their own. It would seem fair to say that these landlords
were using the capital represented in the building to
subsidize their operations.
New Hope for South Holyoke
The 1980's were a time of fast-paced change. The baby-
boomers had been turning 30 and seeking housing. They were
beginning to heat up the market around the country,
especially in Massachusetts, and Holyoke was about to get
warm.
In Massachusetts, Proposition 2-1/2 limited the abilities
of Massachusetts cities to raise taxes to respond to the
increasing demand for affordable housing while the Reagan
administration drastically cut funding for local aid
programs. A liberal governor responded by making affordable
housing a key part of his program. Increased funding was
available for those communities that wanted it.
The City's determination to let South Holyoke deteriorate
faced mounting challenges on the local front as well.
Community activists, who had successfully obtained an
ammendment to the 1968 Master Plan allowing South Holyoke to
remain as a neighorhood, were again pressing the city to
stop its destruction.
Nueva Esperanza, Inc. (NEI, Spanish for "new hope") was
formed by housing advocates in 1982 as a Community
Development Corporation with the primary purpose of
providing "decent, safe, affordable" housing to the
residents of South Holyoke. In the face of overwhelming
opposition from City leaders, they actually began to buy and
fix up buildings in South Holyoke. Their second and most
ambitious project was a 28-unit tax-delinquent property for
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which they had just received a preliminary financing
commitment from the Massachusetts Land Bank.=" While the
Mayor was assuring the organization's staff that they would
not interfere, a wrecking ball was secretly ordered to the
site and a large chunk of the building was torn out before a
court injunction was obtained. The building was
consequently demolished, but not before the City received
the condemnation of the local media and local and state
officials.
NEI went on to develop 119 units of low and moderate
income housing within their 10 block target area in the
residential core of South Holyoke. Their mission statement
includes these goals:
1) To deliver more affordable housing to low-income
neighborhood families;
2) To develop community leadership;
3) To encourage neighborhood economic development;
4) To promote the availability of appropriate community
education and human service programs.
Community participation and control are at the heart of
this agenda. Though they began (and continue) with "bricks
and mortar" development projects, many of their most recent
efforts have been designed to give residents the skills and
resources to determine their own futures. From an
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Harden, p.82.
educational outreach program for pregnant women to the
publication of a bilingual community newspaper, NEI has
attempted to build social networks in which residents are
more able to help themselves and each other.
From the grudging respect of City leaders who recognize
their stabilizing impact, to the enthusiasm of participants
in the annual Family Day Festival, NEI is today widely seen
as a success. At its inception in 1982, however, many
wondered if it would be just another in a long line of South
Holyoke community groups fighting City Hall.
NEI's struggles with the City reinforced Holyoke's
reputation as a place where the poor minority residents were
being driven out. This, in turn, lent support to efforts by
local housing advocates to circumvent the local government
and appeal directly to state and federal officials for
housing assistance. In 1984 NEI completed rehabilitation on
16 federally-subsidized units and obtained commitments for
rehabbing 32 more under the Massachusetts Chapter 707
program. The City's plan to vacate South Holyoke seemed to
be crumbling. In 1985 the Mayor allowed two duplexes to be
built in South Holyoke by Olde Holyoke Development
Corporation and announced that the City was "coming in to
rebuild and rehabilitate" South Holyoke. " For investors
this renewed commitment was an encouraging sign that they
2"Transcript Telegram, 9/5/85.
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intended to take advantage of.
Federal Housing Assistance
In the early 1970's the federal Section 236 and 221-D3
programs provided a substantial source of rental housing
assistance to the City of Holyoke. In the City as a whole,
between 1970 and 1975, 739 new units were built while 289
units were rehabbed under these programs. The value of
building permits for assisted housing during these years
averaged nearly 50% more than that of the private,
unassisted market. This public investment was seen as a
significant boost to the City's real estate values which
were otherwise declining.7"
Only one federally-assisted project was located in South
Holyoke, just a hundred yards from 558 So. Summer St. This
project rehabilitated 127 units for a cost of $2.5 million.
Completed in 1975, the cleaned up buildings were visible
signs that South Holyoke might remain a viable residential
neighborhood despite the continuing destruction.
This much-needed federal assistance was short-lived,
however. The federal commitment to housing that had, in
1968, set a national goal of 26 million new units over 10
years was abruptly curtailed only five years later. In 1973
Curran Associates, Inc., Reinvestment Opportunities: A
Housing Work Program for Holyoke, Summary Report, (Northampton,
MA) 1976.
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President Nixon drastically diminished the use of federal
monies for housing assistance.
The move to Community Development Block Grants and
Section 8 housing allowance payments in 1974 was a dramatic
shift not only in the amount of monies committed to
improving housing opportunities, but also in the form of
that commitment. The old Section 236 Program for renters
and the section 235 Program for homeowners, placed an
emphasis on giving the developer the financial incentives
needed to make a project profitable. Developers of large
projects were able to make use of these programs, while
smaller apartment owners were largely unable to do so. The
new Section 8 programs that sought to enhance the effective
demand of renters moved away from the previous model of
giving subsidies directly to the developer of housing
projects to a method of providing rental assistance directly
to the tenant, instead. The small, private landlord now
could benefit by simply providing a suitable apartment to a
subsidized tenant. It also allowed for a deeper subsidy
payment for poorer tenants. Whereas the previous programs
guaranteed lower than market rents for low income tenants,
the rent levels did not vary according to each household's
income.
This innovation of deeper, non-project subsidies had
three prominent effects for Holyoke's small landlords.
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One: it allowed them to rent to households with almost no
other source of income, and, thus, independent of the
deteriorating household incomes;
two: (since the allowable rent levels were based on the
larger, and more expensive, Springfield metropolitan area
rental market) it allowed them to charge a rent above
what the local market could otherwise support;
and three: it invited the federal bureaucracy and its
proxies into the operation of even the smallest
properties.
Landlords could, in theory, now house the very poor and
still make money. In fact the subsidized very poor were
often a better market than the unsubsidized working poor. On
the other hand, landlords had to meet often arbitrary
standards of housing quality and comparatively complex lease
provisions.
Those best-suited to the new arrangements were able to
"work the system", bending the rules, and hiring savvy
lawyers when the need arose. The fellow handy with a pipe
wrench, responsive to his tenants' racist fears of non-white
subsidy holders, and dependent upon word of mouth to find
reliable tenants was unlikely to take advantage of such a
program. On the other hand, there were professional
businessmen who saw in the new certificates a way to make
seemingly unviable rental housing profitable.
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As subsidy programs
financial viability of the
managemant also increased.
became more important to
rental property, the costs
Subsidies came with numerous
requirements:
legal counsel.
eviction proces
well-documented
These and other
and more expens
Although this
for the tenant,
the tenant wan
administering
Detailed leases contained language requiring
Appeals procedures added months to the
s. Tenant selection procedures had to be
to prove non-discriminatory parctices.
requirements demanded a more sophisticated
ive form of management.
new mediation often meant improved housing
the improvements were not necessarily what
ted, rather they were made to satisfy the
subsidy agent. From a landlord entering into
a private agreement with his tenant to a contractor working
for a large bureaucratic government agency, the investor's
new role again directed his attention away from the actual
resident to a new client-- the state.
Another source of public assistance to the savvy property
owner came indirectly through the new Block Grants. Olde
Holyoke Development Corporation, the City's designated non-
profit agent for housing programs was given responsibility
for the administration of the housing programs now funded
under the Block Grants. One program, called the Interim
Assistance Program (IAP), funded one half the costs of the
repairs on residential properties housing income-qualified
the
of
new
households. The rents on these properties could not be
raised for five years.
The Boom
In 1981, a Boston-based real estate developer began to
take an interest in what he considered to be an under-valued
market. When he tried to buy some apartment buildings in
South Holyoke, he found it impossible to get a mortgage. He
asked Nueva Esperanza, Inc. (NEI), to help him make a
complaint to the Massachusetts Banking Commission, charging
redlining by the banks. After finally obtaining financing,
he began to buy buildings in 1982 at 2-3 times the going
per-unit price. A local bank president angrily called the
developer's lender to complain, to no avail.-' Other
investors began to take note of the appreciating market
values', the 2% vacancy rate, the extremely low sale
prices, the new housing assistance programs being offered by
the state, the easing credit market and the increasing
likelihood that South Holyoke would survive as a residential
neighborhood. South Holyoke's (indeed all of Holyoke's)
real esate boom had begun.
"
7 Interview with Ada Focer, 2/10/91.
"Mr. Scott was impressed by the ability of a single
individual, buying large numbers of apartments to single-handedly
drive prices upward. "He made his own market. He could pay
those prices because he was setting the comparables against which
their value was determined."
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Holyokers watched with amazement that turned to disgust
as waves of investors began buying up multi-family
properties at record prices. The whole city was being
turned on its head. The small conservative landlords who
reduced turnovers with low rent were replaced by aggressive
investors intent on maximizing the resale value by inflating
the rent. Minorities restricted from surrounding housing
markets paid the escalating premium. While all white
buildings with aging, debt-free owner-occupants struggled to
rent their apartments by word-of-mouth at rents below $100
per month, next door, the Puerto Rican tenants in the newly
purchased and highly-leveraged building paid over $300 per
month for a comparable unit.
Their landlords were not long term owners. Properties
"flipped" as often as once a year. Each time the rent was
increased and tenants were always found to pay it, either
through subsidies, or, often, through doubling and even
tripling-up.
There was one sense in which the real estate industry was
also feeding on itself-- in addition to the expanding retail
and service sectors, construction jobs greatly increased
employment opportunities and drew more households to the
area, which in turn stimulated demand for construction.
Vacancy rates in 1986 were less than 1/2 what they had been
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in 1981. ' There seemed to be no end to the spiral of
housing inflation. Meanwhile, several investors watched as
their balance sheets recorded enormous profits.
The story of the Omni Corporation described below is
admittedly an extreme example of the problems that occur
when credit is easy. It is not isolated, however. Tenant
advocates in Holyoke are finding this story repeated in
dozens of buildings throughout the City, including 558 South
Summer. Where inexperienced investors were allowed to
leverage exorbitant acquisition prices with unsupportable
debt burdens, the result has been financially stressed
properties lacking minimal services and upkeep leading,
ultimately, to receivership and foreclosure.
The Omni Story
Directly across the street from 558 South Summer,
investors paid $26,000 per unit for 563 South Summer in
early 1987 at the height of the real estate boom in
Massachusetts. They bought 12 buildings and 364 units for
$8 million over a period of 10 months. The owners were
young Hartford investors including the head of one of
Hartford's largest Century 21 real estate agencies, John
Zubretsky. The founder of Omni Group Inc., Mark Shapiro,
was only 25 years old when he convinced Zubretsky to join
=Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Postal Vacancy Survey,
Springfield SMSA, 1981 and 1986.
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him in the winter of 1986 to form a company and buy a
Hartford building. At the time Shapiro was a bank loan
officer and a recent graduate of Central Connecticut State
College. Within two years Omni invested over $15,000,000 in
35 buildings including theose in Holyoke.
Buying buildings in lots that held approximately 70 units
each, Omni created separate business entities to hold them.
In Holyoke, each building belonged to a limited partnership
formed by an agreement that prohibited using the income from
one property to be used for another. One of Omni's
investor/partners in a Hartford property accused Shapiro of
violating that agreement. Curtiss Clemens, a residential
investment specialist, found out that insurance on Omni's
Holyoke properties was being paid with checks from his
Hartford property. Other checks he found were issued to
Shapiro and a fictitious tenant. Clemens claimed that Omni
milked the property to provide him with cash for his other
investments.
In Hartford, apartments must be certified by the city
before a new tenant can move into an apartment. Without the
certificate, a tenant may withold the rent. Clemens claims
that the 20 unit property had all its certificates when Omni
and Clemens purchased the property. When the property was
resold in 6 months, there were only 7 units holding
certificates. In the meantime the rent had been increased
and Clemens felt certain that there was sufficient income to
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cover the necessary repairs. When Shapiro told him that the
tenants were not paying the rent, he checked tenants'
receipts and the partnership's bank account. Rents were
being paid, but not deposited. Clemens got back his initial
investment after the sale, but he made nothing on the
venture. Shapiro's original partner, Zubretsky sued Shapiro
and eventually was able to regain half of what he said he
was owed.
The banks were not so lucky. One Hartford building Omni
purchased for $750,000. They received a mortgage from one
bank for $450,000. A second mortgage was arranged without
the knowledge of the first bank for $250,000. The Omni
partners covered the balance with $50,000. Not long
afterward a third mortgage was obtained for $350,000 on the
property. It wasn't until the second mortgage holder tried
to foreclose that the bank discovered that the level of debt
on the property was $300,000 more than the purchase price.
This building, by the way, had not benefitted from any
serious capital improvements. According to the news
reports, the $300,000 simply disappeared.
In Holyoke, the Bank of New England could not claim
deceit. Omni requested a mortgage on 563 South Summer
Street for $22,000 of the $26,000 per unit purchase price.
This same building was bought only two years before for
$12,000 per unit or $10,000 per unit less than the value of
the requested mortgage. The bank, nevertheless, accepted
the new value. At this price, the seller was able to leave
$4,000 per unit in a second mortgage and still walk away
with $10,000 more per unit than he had originally paid for
it two years before. Assuming the seller had invested
$3,000 per unit of his own equity two years before, his
annual return on equity would have been over 150%, a
generous return even if he never saw a penny from the second
mortgage. The buyer, by the same token, had no personal
equity in the building. Only the bank, of all those
involved, had taken any risks and that was with depositors'
money.
Another Holyoke property owner was also approached by
Shapiro to buy his buildings. By the end of their meeting
this owner was amazed to find that Shapiro was going to be
able to leave the closing not only without investing any
equity, but he would actually pocket tens of thousands of
dollars. 4*
Increasing Liabilities: Litigating the Landlord/Tenant
Relationship
Another major factor affecting the small property owner
has been the expanding legal protections afforded the tenant
under federal and Massachusetts laws, regulations, and
judicial decisions. Most lawyers I spoke with traced the
4
'oInterview with Leon Barlow, 5/4/91.
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"revolution" in landlord/tenant law in Massachusetts to the
1973 ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court on Boston Housing
Authority v. Hemingway. This established the so-called
"warranty of habitability' * in which landlords were now
required to keep their properies "livable" as defined by the
State Sanitary Code and local health regulations. It
further stated that tenants could withold their rent while
the violations lasted.
In 1978, further regulations outlawed "unfair and
deceptive acts by landlords and required separate receipts
for security deposits which must be put into escrow
accounts, with interest paid annually to the tenant. This
year also saw legislation passed that required courts to
presume that retaliation is the cause behind any rent
increases or evictions occuring within six months of an
action by the tenant seeking to enforce housing codes or
organize a tenants' union.
The State revised its sanitary code in 1981, setting
stricter standards for health and safety. In 1987 the
appeals court ruled that utility costs are the landlord's
responsibility unless otherwise specified in writing. In
that same year a law regarding eviction procedures set
Mass., 293 N.E.2d 831
further restrictions on exactly how and when a an eviction
could be carried out.42
Nationally, civil rights legislation has established
protected categories of individuals who must be allowed
equal access to housing. Recently this list has been
expanded. It makes it illegal to refuse housing to anyone,
based on their membership in one of these protected
categories.
The above is not intended to present a comprehensive list
of applicable laws, regulations and judicial rulings. The
point is that this body of law is expanding and it is
intended to protect the tenant against the improper
activities by the landlord. With the availability of legal
redress, the landlord is compelled to pay much closer
attention to both the intent and the letter of the law.
Although many of these new rules are good commonsense and
easily obeyed, they do add to the complexity of property
management and increase the risks of being sued for a lack
of proper care.
One landlord lawyer I spoke with summed this up
succinctly when he said,
My advice to anyone thinking about buying rental
property today is, "Don't. Unless you are very
4 2Springfield Sunday Republican, "Court rulings have changed
tenant-landlord relationships", 2/5/89.
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familiar with the laws and can afford to hire a
scrupulous management agent, it's not worth the risk.
Technical knowledge, professionalism, administrative
precision and risk avoidance take on increasing value in a
litigious environment. Although there is still a place for
personal attention to the needs of one's tenants, the modern
manager of low-grade rental housing will find that he is
more likely to survive if he views his tenants as potential
plaintiffs than as long-term guests or trusted customers.
This evolving dissociation in the landlord/tenant
relationship over the last twenty-five years is illustrated
in the following discussion of 558 South Summer Street.
CHAPTER 5: THE HISTORY OF 558 SOUTH SUMMER STREET
1887 to 1923
After Holyoke Water Power Company began to relax its
stringent controls on housing development in the 1870's, it
then joined in with some housing development of its own.
The building that stands at 558 South Summer Street was
built in 1887 by the Company and sold immediately to Damasse
Chatel, a carpenter employed at a local thread company. At
the time of the sale he lived in a house just up the street.
Upon purchase, he immediately moved into one of the eight,
five room apartments in the new building and stayed there
until he sold it in 1910 to Alfred Gelinas, a grocer, who
also moved into the building. Sale prices, during those
years, were not recorded directly in the registry of deeds.
However, the registry does note that Mr. Gelinas did assume
a $4500 mortgage from Mr. Chattel when he bought it. The
City Directory begins listing residents of 558 South Summer
St. in 1915 and, judging from the surnames, the ethnic mix
of tenants was French and German. The job categories listed
were "laborer", "painter", "mechanic" (owner of machine
shop), and "employee(s)" of a lumberyard and a steamboiler
works.
Between 1915 and 1922, when Mr. Gelinas sold it, the
building experienced only six turnovers of residents. In
1922 five out of the eight tenants had lived there longer
than 7 years and the average length of tenure was over 6
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years. In 1922, the tenants included two widows in addition
to the painter, laborer, boxmaker, and paperworker.
The next owner only held the building for 5 months.
Buying at the peak of Holyoke's population expansion,
Phillippe Denis bought 558 S. Summer in the fall of 1922.
He obtained financing through two new mortgages, one from a
local bank and one from Mr. Gelinas, the seller, in addition
to assuming Mr. Gelinas' earlier mortgage. When he sold the
building to Napoleon Labrecque, a paper mill employee, the
next spring, he had tripled the debt owed on the building.
Though it is difficult to determine the exact sale prices at
that time, the tax stamp values added to the debt would
indicate that Mr. Denis sold 558 S. Summer for 15'. more than
what he paid for it, five months earlier.
1924 - 1965
During this period of economic stagnation, South
Holyoke's shrinkage provided some relief for the
overcrowding of the previous 50 years. However, toward the
end of that period, the softening demand for apartments
turned to a serious vacancy problem and the viability of the
entire neighborhood was put into question. In the meantime,
this period represents almost a golden age for many of those
who lived in the neighborhood.
Mr. Labrecque, the new owner of 558 S. Summer in 1924,
also moved into the building-- to an apartment on the first
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floor. He lived there for 9 years until his death in 1933,
while his wife stayed on for another 11. When she died, her
son, a resident in the building, inherited the property and
ran it for still another 5 years. In all, the Labrecques'
ownership lasted over 25 years. Water utility records and
the complete turnover of apartments suggest that the
Labrecques made substantial renovations in 1927. From 1927
until the next sale in 1948, there were only 21 turnovers.
The average length of tenure grew quite long during the
Labrecque's ownership. In 1930 it was only 3 years. In
1935, it was 5 years, expanding to 7, 9, and 11 years in
1940, 1945, and 1948.
The long tenures of tenants in the building peaked in
1960 with an average of 13 years. According to one tenant
(1948-1965) the most common reasons for turnovers in the
building toward the end of her tenancy were either for older
tenants moving closer to their children or younger families
purchasing a home in the suburbs. She also recalls that, at
most, twelve children lived in the eight 3-bedroom
apartments.'V Judging from the City Directory, there was
always at least one single person household in the building.
If seven apartments held couples, then we can assume there
were 15 adults for a total of 27 persons. That yields a
little more than 3 persons per unit. The age when
Conversation with Mrs. Wilfred Desmarais, 5/23/91.
apartments in that same neighborhood averaged over 20 people
per apartment seemed hard to imagine for a resident of that
later era.
When Ray Marion bought the building in 1948 he was an
oilman with his own business. He was part of a new wave of
investors in the neighborhood consisting of young
businessmen who bought several adjoining or nearby buildings
from aging landlords or their children. He found 558 S.
Summer St. available for sale when Napoleon Labrecque's son
decided to return to his native Canada. Marion's sister and
her husband moved into the Labrecque's apartment immediately
and they stayed there until Mr. Marion sold it in 1965.
Marion kept an office on Main Street where the rent could be
paid once a week, or when Mrs. Marion came around to
collect. Marion's sister/tenant, Mrs. Wilfred Desmarais,
can't remember problems with rent collection, much less a
single eviction, during her seventeen years in the building.
These problems, according to Mrs. Desmarais, were avoided
by the traditional tenant recruitment process, in which only
those who were personally referred by existing tenants (or
the landlord) were considered for the apartments.
Communication among the tenants was high where many were
related or had lived together for some time. There were
often afternoon gatherings on the back porches during the
hot summer afternoons. Tenants each bought their own
awnings to protect their section of the porch and they sat
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sipping iced tea as the children played in the yard below.
With a family member in the building, the landlord was also
assured a direct line to issues discussed in those
gatherings.
Maintenance consisted primarily in the services of an
experienced plumber who would respond to emergency calls
from Mrs. Desmarais. Cleaning and yard work was shared by
the tenants. Mr. Marion was "quite handy" himself and he
looked after the small repairs to windows, doors, linoleum,
etc. himself. A few major repair jobs required outside
contractors and these included the complete renovation of
the back porches, the hallways and the roof and the
installation of storm windows. Everyone had their own key
to the basement where the fuseboxes were kept and tenants
were responsible for maintaining their oil or gas stoves
themselves, including hot water boilers.
Rents were $8.00 per week in 1948 and were increased to
$10.00 in 1953 after the hot water was centralized and some
major repairs had been made. The rent did not change after
that until the next owner bought it in 1965. The 1960
Census reports median income for South Holyoke at $4,914.
With total annual rent at $520, the rent/income ratio was
only 10.6%-- very affordable by today's standards.
In the meantime the property continued to return a
reliable income to its owner, Mr. Marion, who claims that,
"my rule of thumb was always to make a twenty percent annual
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return on my investment". Mr. Marion would not reveal the
exact figures, but, according to the registry of deeds, Mr.
Marion paid $7,000 for the building and immediately obtained
a $10,500 mortgage. This he paid off sometime during his
seventeen year ownership. Assuming a 6% interest on a 15
year self-amortizing note, his annual debt service would
have been $1,063. Collecting over $4,100 in annual rents,
the balance available for operating expenses was over $3,000
or almost 75% of the gross income. Assuming the $3,500 in
additional mortgage capital paid for all the major
improvements he was reported to have made in the first three
years, Mr. Marion could count on this balance to pay for his
expenses and to keep whatever was left.
Mr. Marion insists that his keys to success were (1) a
low vacancy rate and (2) self-management. Though he
acknowledges that the process was very demanding personally,
he insists that he was able, so long as he kept the
buildings full and he did most of the work himself, to
maintain a decent return. His sale in 1975 was for no other
reason than he "had grown tired of i'.'He may have also
been feeling the pressure of rising vacancies. The City
Directory, which annually surveys the residents at each
address, only once recorded a vacancy in any unit between
1947 and 1962. In 1963 and 1964 the Directory reported two
**Interview with Ray Marion, 5/15/91.
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vacancies in each year. Of two of the households that left
during those two years, Mrs. Desmarais remembers that one
left when the father lost his job in a local shoe factory
and the other when the elderly mother died.
1965 - The Present
Demolition, abandonment, arson, and City-led efforts to
depopulate South Holyoke characterize the 1970's and early
1980's in this neighborhood. However, the late 1060's were
remembered as a period of little change despite the
ominously rising vacancy rates measured by the 1970 census.
In 1965 Mr. Marion sold 558 South Summer to a couple who
lived in nearby South Hadley, Fernand and Margaret Dube.
His sale did not remove him from all interest in the
property, however. According to registry records, the full
price of the building was covered by Mr. Marion's twenty
year, 6'4 mortgage. His sister promptly moved out but the
new owners failed to move in. Due to health problems, the
Dube's resold the property the following year for under
$100, subject to the Marion mortgage. The new owners,
Roland and Ellen Sawyer, held the property for 6 years.
They also did not move into the building and their ownership
witnessed a period of sharply increased turnovers and high
vacancy rates. According to the City Directory's survey,
vacancies averaged over two out of the eight units each
year. One household that left in 1970, bought a home in
nearby Willimansett after having lived in the building for
over 27 years.
The Sawyers sold the building in 1972 to another couple
who continued to struggle with the high vacancies. By the
time they sold it again in 1975, it was in "poor
condition.. .six months from condemnation", according to the
new owner, Charles Desmarais (no relation to Mrs. Wilfred
Desmarais). Mr. Desmarais and his partner were school
teachers who at one time owned up to 36 units in South
Holyoke. They decided to purchase 558 because it was close
to the other buildings and this made the maintenance easier.
The City's plan to turn the neighborhood into an industrial
park did not deter them. "Despite the talk, we could see
the drastic shortage of rental units. We didn't believe
them." The large three-bedroom units in 558 South Summer
were in especially high demand by the new larger families
moving into the neighborhood. Unlike all their other
purchases, 558 South Summer was acquired by simply assuming
the existing mortgage. Their general plan for each of the
buildings they bought at this time was basically this:
Step One: Buy buildings in trouble but still salvageable
for as little as possible;
Step Two: Make improvements to vacant units and rent for
as much as possible;
Step Three: Wait for long-term "elderly French" tenants
to move out and repeat Step Two;
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Step Four: When cash flow is adequate, then use the
City's residential improvement program to make more
substantial repairs (eg:roofs, porches, boilers, etc.)
After mandated five year limit expires, raise rents to
market levels.
This illustrates an earlier point in the discussion about
general trends in Holyoke. Even though household income was
not keeping pace with the costs of providing shelter, it was
still possible to increase rents as long as those households
were willing to pay a larger percentage of their income for
rent. As low-rent units were being demolished around the
country, desperate households emigrated to those cities
where such housing remained. They bolstered the rental
market and provided investors like Mr. Desmarais and his
partner an opportunity to make profits where others,
unwilling or unable to open their doors to the new
immigrants, had failed.
They did all the smaller repairs themselves and spent
much of their summers replacing floors and old plumbing.
The first two years they saw little profit from their
investments. After that the income was more than sufficient
to cover their time and expenses. Retained earnings from
the first investments went into buying other properties.
The key to success for these investors, as it had been for
Mr. Marion before them was low vacancies. Income was
generated by the cash flow of the property. They never
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refinanced their properties even after the mortgages had
been paid off. Mr. Desmarais argues that they couldn't
"cash out" on their properties, despite the tax advantages
because the interest rates on mortgages had been so high
during their time in business. They reasoned that interest
payments only cost them money.
558 South Summer received a number of badly needed
repairs during the 10 years that Mr. Desmarais owned the
building. The roof, the windows, the floors, and the rear
porches were replaced with the help of an assistance program
provided by the City thourgh the Olde Holyoke Development
Corporation. "All the major repairs had been done when we
sold it in 1985."
It also experienced a significant shift in tenancy.
Nineteen seventy-seven welcomed seven new tenants to the
eight unit building. Six of these with Spanish surnames.
At least two of these households were living the previous
year at addresses in the embattled Ward One. Only one
vacancy appears for the following five years, after which
the City Directory has no record.
The practice of letting the existing tenants recommend
new tenants didn't work, according to Desmarais. "We
weren't very good at screening" new applicants, he says.
"We had some trouble with bad tenants and we later used a
professional screening service to help." The screening
service couldn't reduce the wear and tear that these new
households brought to the building. The new households paid
more in rent than the older, smaller households that they
had replaced, but they demanded more in services too. It
was still possible to make a living with the buildings, but
it was clear that increasing liabilities from lead paint and
other hazards, were going to make it increasingly difficult
to manage such housing in the future. It was, therefore,
with great surprise that these two partners received an
offer in 1985 to buy three of their buildings (holding
twenty apartments) at over $9,500 per unit. By retaining a
$2,500 per unit two year balloon note, they still were able
to pocket over $7,000 per unit at the sale.
We couldn't see how he could make a profit on them.
Especially since he wasn't going to manage them
himself. He not only underestimated the fragility of
those buildings, but he also was depending on increased
rents that the market just couldn't bear. Not for
long.4
The new owner, Mr. Sheedy, was not willing to discuss his
investment strategy. Information is available from the
Registry of Deeds, however. These indicate that the banks
had more confidence in the value of Mr. Sheedy's investments
than did Mr. Desmarais and his partner. Examining his
mortgages on Holyoke properties for the period between
"Interview with Charles Desmarais, 5/15/91.
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January 10, 1985 when he bought his first Holyoke property
to November 1, 1989, when he added a third blanket mortgage
to his entire Holyoke holdings, I found that the outstanding
debt on his buildings as of November 1989 totalled
$2,150,000 in mortgages. This was on properties that he
bought for $921,000, the earliest only four years before.
He told one interested buyer that the debt owed on the
building at 558 South Summer St is $15,000 per unit. The
tenants can not account for the $5,500 per unit in
additional capital that Sheedy has borrowed since the
building was bought for $9,500 per unit 5 years ago.
The management of the properties was originally
contracted out to a "cut-rate" local property management
firm, but now it's managed through Sheedy's own company.
Residents I talked to in his buildings say that requests for
repairs go unanswered for months at a time. The tenants of
558 South Summer St. have begun witholding their rent with
the help of local Legal Services attorneys.
According to the bank holding the first mortgage, they
have not received interest payments for several months.
Their discussions with Mr. Sheedy seem to have failed to
reach an acceptable agreement and they are currently seeking
to have the properties placed in a receivership. The bank
has begun negotiations with a large property management firm
and the likelihood is that the properties will be foreclosed
and sold once the buildings are stabilized.
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Not much is known about Mr. Sheedy's background. He
lists his address as Lexington, Massachusetts. It's not
known whether he had any real estate or property management
experience before coming to Holyoke. The obvious question
is whether his interest in Holyoke's rental properties
derived, like Mr. Shapiro's, from the availability of risk-
free credit and the promise of pyramid-like leveraging.
The deterioration of 558 South Summer St. and other of
Mr. Sheedy's buildings attracted the attention of the owner
of buildings that stand on either side of his South Summer
Street property. That owner was Nueva Esperanza, Inc.
(NEI). An organizer for NEI met with tenants and their
lawyers to discuss solutions to the crisis. Conversations
with Mr. Sheedy and an examination of the building, together
with reports of tax and utility company liens, convinced
members of the group that Mr. Sheedy did not have the
capacity to manage the building. This "Group" was concerned
that something would have to be done quickly or the building
(and possibly those on either side) might be irretrievably
lost.
The next step was to contact the bank and try to gauge
their intentions. This brought a visit by a bank officer to
the building. He was "shocked" at the state of the building
and was concerned that their interest in the buildings was
at some risk. The Group then met to determine what the
likely course would be for the banks and to see if there was
some way they could encourage the banks to foreclose and
then turn the buildings over to them at a nominal price.
The bank instead decided to seek a receivership through a
large property management firm that handled NEI's
properties. The bank was unwilling to commit any further
but its stated intent was to allow the receivership several
months to stabilize the buildings and clear up any serious
health hazards before it foreclosed.
This bank had also just committed itself to a large piece
of the financing of another NEI housing project with units
across the street from 558 South Summer Street. The Group
felt that interest in that project might enhance their
commitment to preserving 558 South Summer Street. That
feeling was confirmed when they learned that the bank would
put up $250,000 for financing the receivership. As I write
this, the management agent is seeking liability insurance to
cover the properties.
NEI's interest in the property stems from their
commitment to preserving existing housing resources within
South Holyoke. It would be hard to imagine this
organization choosing to demolish a residential building
unless it was completely unsalvageable. Considerations of
residential "density" or competing land-uses are secondary.
Furthermore, there is little consideration given to the
development of housing or neighborhood amenities that might
attract more affluent residents. The focus is on providing
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the greatest support for those in the greatest need. In all
their housing developments to date they have sought to
maximize the numbers of deep operating subsidies and thus
the benefits provided to the lowest-income households
possible. This redistibutive, advocacy role is in sharp
contrast to another non-profit housing developer in Holyoke
to be discussed in the next section.
The Evolutionary Process
The last seventy-five years at 558 South Summer Street
illustrate the evolution of rental property investment in
South Holyoke. Originally owned by owner-occupants, these
investors were forced by proximity to relate to their
tenants as neighbors as well. These earlier
able to obtain a reasonable profit by simply
tenants from moving out. Earlier tenants
small portions of their income for their
landlords employed informal and personal
safeguard their investments. They put
personal contact.
Whereas Ray Marion put his sister into the
landlords were
keeping their
paid relatively
rent. These
mechanisms to
a premium on
building, kept
the same tenants for long periods, worked in an office down
the street and sold oil to others in the neighborhood, later
investors were much less connected to the neighborhood they
served. They were from out of town and knew little about
their tenants and often distrusted them. This evolution
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reached its pinnacle in the ownership of Mr. Sheedy who
demonstrated little interest in effective management or
personal contacts with tenants and other members of the
community.
Significantly, Sheedy bought the property in 1985, one
year before the new tax laws would wipe out much of his
supposed incentives for this investment. Perhaps he was not
simply looking to shelter income, reap speculative gains, or
cream off refinancing proceeds. Nevertheless, his choice of
managers and his failure to respond to the serious
deterioration of his buildings indicates that he was
thoroughly unprepared for the rigorous demands of a rent-
driven rental market.
While Desmarais used little debt, Sheedy loaded it on;
while Desmarais kept in close touch with his tenants,
Sheedy's tenants had never heard of him; whereas Desmarais
kept costs down by doing his own repairs, Sheedy hired a
low-budget manager.
In order to be successful Desmarais needed to reduce his
vacancies and turnovers. That required tenant satisfaction
and prompt attention to the needs of the tenants. Still
property owners during those years were finding the business
difficult to maintain. As tenants were living closer to the
edge in order to make their rental payments, collections
became more difficult and, as the overcrowding took its toll
on the buildings, maintenance costs soared. The rewards for
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hard work for these traditional investors were shrinking and
they began to wonder whether the headaches were worth it.
New investors like Sheedy were familiar enough with the
credit market and tax laws to see lucrative opportunities
available despite the increasing difficulty of managing low-
grade rental properties. Their entry into the market
allowed traditional owners the escape they were looking for.
The traditional owners' retreat from the low-grade rental
market grew out of a long history of deteriorating
conditions. Perhaps it was inevitable that some other form
of investment would replace it. However, this particular
form of investment has made the problem far worse. By
redefining the investment value of these properties as a tax
shelter, an appreciating commodity, or a piece of
collateral, those who were attracted to invest were
generally more skilled in financial markets than cost-
effective property management. In the meantime, those who
had property management skills had gotten out and were
unwilling to return. Investors like Sheedy were ill-
prepared for the resumption of business-as-usual in a rent-
driven market.
These properties had proven very difficult to manage
under the best of conditions. Their new owners not only
brought few skills to the problem, but they had also created
further problems by adding on layers of unsupportable debt.
Resale became nearly impossible without foreclosure. With
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noone willing to buy them out at any price; with no
possibility of being able to work the problem through; these
new owners had taken these properties down a dead end road
with no way to turn back.
Though the case of 558 South Summer Street may be an
extreme example of this evolutionary process, it does offer
a convincing illustration of the changing pattern of
investment in low-grade rental real estate. As the
traditional role of the landlord as one who provides a
service to the tenant was weakened by the declining ability
of the renter household to contribute to operating costs,
the availability of rental properties for marginal profit-
making increased. Those who took advantage of these
opportunities further weakened the traditional role by
emphasizing the use of their buildings as an investment
rather than as a home to their tenants.
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CHAPTER 6: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND FUTURE TRENDS
When The Music Stops
The boom of the mid 1980's could not last. All over the
Northeast, the surge of residential real estate development
had inevitably overshot the market demand. A slumping
economy combined with the continued delivery of housing
units put in the pipeline years before, led to a glut of of
empty rental units. These included units of the relatively
new housing product--condominiums--which, originally
produced for sale, were then rented out when they failed to
sell. Forty-six percent of newly-built apartments in the
Northeast in 1988 were still not rented 3 months after
completion.* This was the lowest rate in at least 8 years.
As renters changed their addresses to take advantage of the
soft buyers' market, moving up to accomodations in the newly
constructed apartments and condominiums, the filtering
process eventually left the most marginal properties
unoccupied.
In some sections of Holyoke the vacancy rates were
nearing 25".. Plywood-covered windows began appearing
throughout Wards One and Two. Many landlords whom I talked
to wanted "to kick themselves for not getting out in time".
"How could I have known?" they often asked. They saw
4U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Housinq Reports series
H-130 and H-131.
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themselves as losers in a game of musical chairs, left
without a chair when the speculative "music" stopped. Many
were trying to cut their losses by selling off pieces of
their holdings. With very few buyers, landlords were often
willing to simply give up title in exchange for a second
mortgage. Even that has been difficult to do, especially
when the property is in very poor physical condition and has
a very high vacancy rate. One investor claimed that there
simply is no one willing to buy these properties at this
time, at any price.
Tenant advocates in Holyoke estimate that over 50 rental
buildings are in some form of serious financial distress.
Everyone I spoke with, including landlords with over 50
years of experience, were convinced that these properties
represented just the tip of the iceberg. They all could
recount other properties "just on the brink" and likely to
fail in the coming months.
Overleveraging was mentioned as only one in a series of
factors offered by observers for the real estate crash.
Overleveraging does have the unique effect, however, of
capturing the interest of large and influential players--
the institutional lenders. How they and their debtor
investors respond to the changing market will have an
important impact on the future of South Holyoke and the City
as a whole. After a discussion of lenders' strategies this
chapter examines investors' strategies and, finally, that of
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Olde Holyoke Development Corporation, a non-profit housing
developer whose policies are well-tuned to the current
climate of conservative government and declining commitments
to the housing of the very low income household. Their
policies and plans for responding to the current crisis
should be instructive of the future role of public officials
in many other localities around the country.
The Lenders' Options
As owners fall behind in their mortgage payments, the
lenders become increasingly active in the fates of these
properties. With no wish to own these troubled properties,
they first seek to reach a "workout" with the owner where
the bank agrees to reduce the debt service or defer it in
exchange for a renewed commitment by the owner to make
timely payments. If that fails, the bank may seek to
foreclose and sell the properties. When the Bank of New
England attempted to auction off the foreclosed Omni
properties in 1990, only four out of the six parcels brought
a price they were willing to accept. Perhaps that is why
there have been few such foreclosure auctions of multi-
family rental properties. Buying properties back through a
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holding company, as the Bank of New England did, is
considered a poor option by bankers I spoke with. '-
The remaining option is the receivership. The bank may
ask the court to appoint a receiver who will protect their
investment in the building until they can safely foreclose
and sell it for a better price. Stabilizing a property and
holding on to it without accepting liability, the
receivership option offers the lender a relatively safe
means to protect his investment, while waiting for the
market to heat up again.
According to one banker, the decision to stay in a
workout, file for receivership, or foreclose is based on a
calculation of the various returns for each strategy. For
example, where the current market value of a property is one
third the value of the mortgage balance, a workout that
guarantees interest payments on one half of the original
mortgage balance may seem the best deal possible. On the
other hand, the owner may appear incapable of managing the
property, despite the improved terms of the workout.
Without a change in management, the property may appear
likely to further deteriorate in value. The lender may thus
conclude that spending $3,000 per unit under a new
management team would forestall an anticipated $5,000 per
Although a former Massachusetts banking commissioner did
say that many banks are, in fact, buying their foreclosed
properties at inflated values. In this way the banks' balance
sheets appear healthier than they actually are.
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unit deterioration in property value, yielding a net savings
of $2,000 per unit. In this scenario, spending more money
makes sense.
Though the lender could conceivably foreclose and hire
its own management team, lenders, as I have said, prefer not
to own property. Under receivership, the bank does not
assume ownership or liability for damages arising out of the
operation of the property. At a time when rental property
insurers are severely reducing their exposure to lead paint
poisoning claims and new legislation obligates the banks to
remove all hazardous wastes before they can resell a
property, the banks are especially wary of owning such old
rental properties as these. In fact they have been willing
to pay thousands of dollars per unit per year to subsidize
the continued operation of these buildings as they wait for
the market to improve. We have seen how this operated in
the case of the property at 558 South Summer.
But what happens to properties when the lender cannot
hope to recoup its losses? when adding another $3,000 per
unit will not forestall deterioration and the lender refuses
to make additional investments? According to legislative
testimony given by Holyoke housing activists and tenants,
its State Senator, and the Hampden County housing court
judge, Holyoke has suffered a great deal recently from "a
vacuum in management" arising from bankrupt investors and
97
bankers leaving rental properties
without basic services. *a
In one of these cases, during the long period in which
we searched for a receiver, the buildings suffered a
heavy, and perhaps irreparable toll from vandalism and
arson. As a result many were and still are
condemned.**
The profligate lending of the mid-1980's has ensured a
major role for lenders in the immediate future of Holyoke's
housing. Although the soft market has put pressure on
property values to settle back to a price level more in line
with the actual cash flow of the property, the banks may
resist a decline to prices that are far below their current
investment. We have seen in the case of 558 South Summer
how Mr. Sheedy was willing to sell his building for just the
**The Massachusetts legislature is currently considering an
"Act Clarifying the Powers of Housing Receivers". Support for
this legislation comes, in part, from the difficulties that
receivers have had in obtaining the capital necessary to run a
building or the protection from damage claims that exceed their
insurance coverage.
These problems have been addressed in this bill in two
significant ways. One, it grants the receiver the right to place
a "priority lien", which allows the reciever a first position
(ahead of the banks and other non-governmental lien holders) on
the assets. This would provide the receiver some guarantee that
the money it spent on the property for the purpose of making
necessary repairs would indeed be repaid. Two, it would limit
the liability of the receiver to the proceeds of its insurance
and "in no instance... for negligence".
'Glassman, Rick, "Written Testimony in Support of S.627,
3/15/91". Western Massachusetts Legal Services, Holyoke.
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liability-conscious
debt that the bank held on his buildings. Selling at a
lower price would have been more expensive to him than
simply holding on. The combined effect of dozens of highly
leveraged investors like Mr. Sheedy is that prices are
effectively set by the banks who control the debt.
As large financial institutions with substantial
investments in Holyoke's low-income rental housing, the
banks are carrying an unusually large share of the financial
risk in the future of Holyoke's private, rental housing
market. Their decision whether to step in and take over a
distressed property has implications for their loan
portfolio beyond the immediate property in question.
Several rental properties in the same neighborhood may hold
loans from the same bank. Neighboring buildings may be put
at risk if the bank allows one building to fall victim to
vandalism, arson or abandonment. The old adage, "Borrow
$1,000 you've got a creditor; borrow $1,000,000 and you've
got a partner," could apply in this case. Large lending
institutions with mortgages on several buildings in a
neighborhood will treat a delinquent loan on a building in
that neighborhood differently than if the building were
alone. Though it is hard to predict how the banks will
calculate their investment in a neighborhood, there is at
least the possibility that some banks will begin to work
more closely with neighborhood-based developers of low
income housing, at least until their interests are secure.
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In any event, as long as other investors are unwilling to
step in and current owners fail to make interest payments on
their mortgages, the banks will be forced to carry a great
deal of the burden of supporting these properties.
Beyond the Bust:
Investors Adjust to Rent-Driven Financial Management
Eventually, everyone expects, the business cycle will
bottom out and a recovery will bring new tenants seeking
low-income housing. Decreasing vacancies will reduce
operating deficits; acquisition prices will be lower (in
real terms); credit markets will re-open; and some investors
may again find that it is profitable to operate low-grade
rental real estate. The underlying problems will not have
disappeared however. It will still be expensive to finance,
insure, maintain and secure a lead-painted, inner-city,
family apartment building. Responses from investors asked
what they saw ahead were rarely optimistic. A common
response from many investors working with low-grade rental
housing was that they were "looking to get out of that line
of property" or that they were "seeking to upgrade (their)
portfolio".
Several successful investors I had spoken with had
entered the market when buildings were very cheap, as now,
and had cashed in on those investments when they had
appreciated. I asked them if they would encourage anyone to
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get into the market now, assuming they could get the right
price for a building. Most were skeptical. They encouraged
new investors to avoid buildings with lead paint; that
lacked central heating; that held "bad" tenants who drove
out good tenants and drove up maintenance and legal costs;
or that had deteriorated too far. They emphasized that the
risks of being sued made it dangerous to own much of the
low-grade rental housing. One lawyer who specializes in
representing landlords told me that he has been advising
small investors to stay out of the rental market unless they
could afford a very good management agent. "With the loss
of real estate tax shelters", said one management agent,
"investors will need to to be very conscious of their costs.
And costs for these properties are high."
Now that the marginal profit-making opportunities for
Holyoke's low-grade rental properties are gone, what are the
"real" benefits of investing in these properties? Investors
will always search for lower prices and more cost effective
ways to manage them. To some extent that is happening. One
investor described the current situation as a "shakeout"
with lots of poor property managers being bought out by
tougher managers. However, there are limits to how much
they can cut costs and still maintain a building for the
long term.
Similarly, there is a wide range of rents that tenants
are willing to pay. However, the tenant can not pay more
101
than he or she earns. Owners of rental properties that sit
at the lowest end of the quality scale are going to be
particularly sensitive to the earning potential of those
lowest on the income scale. How investors view their
expenses and their sources of income in these rental
properties are important keys to future investments in these
properties.
Based on the 1990 operating budgets for five poorly
maintained buildings with 38 units in South Holyoke, I have
developed what I believe to be a characteristic operating
budget for a marginal rental property in Holyoke. This
budget includes hot water but no heat, electricity or
cooking fuel. ** By reducing the maintenance expenses to
reflect the likely costs of running a more properly
maintained building and adding the Section 8 Utility
Allowances for heat, electricity and cooking fuel, the
overall expenses for a two-bedroom unit in such a building
would equal approximately $3,800 per year. This is in line
with other apartment buildings whose managers quoted figures
between $3,000 and $4,500 per unit for comparable
properties. These did not include any deleading (estimated
at $5,000 per apartment), mortgage interest payments,
vacancy costs or replacement reserves. Neither do they
The Community Builders, Inc., "South City Housing 1989
Budget", 1988.
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include the costs of major rehabilitation which would be
needed for any building with a long history of neglect.
For a landlord who owns the property "free and clear"
(without a mortgage), $3,800 per year is the line below
which the property must suffer or he must lose money, either
in his unpaid time or the infusion of cash. Assuming that
the unit carries $10,000 in debt at 10%/year, the resulting
interest payments would increase the rent by over $1,000 per
year. The breakeven rent that the landlord would have to
charge is $400 per month.
These are the expected operating costs facing today's
investor. What about his income? Finding tenants who can
pay a rent that covers these costs and still allow him a
profit is the obvious challenge. Holyoke currently has
approximately 5,000 unsubsidized rental units that must be
supported with the rent paid by the households who occupy
them."" It is also estimated that 1,750 AFDC households are
living in them, most of them in South Holyoke and the
adjoining Churchill area.52 Even with doubling and tripling
up, which one housing advocate estimated at 30%, this
population represents a significant portion of the tenant
demand for unsubsidized rental units in Holyoke's lower-
*'Donahue Institute for Governmental Services, "Holyoke
Housing Study", 1989.
saDepartment of Public Welfare, "ET Managerial Information--
Month of July, 1990, Holyoke".
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grade properties. A household of 4 on AFDC in Holyoke
currently receives $8,016 per year. The median household
income for South Holyoke should be approximately $8,600P4.
At $400 per month an AFDC household would pay 60% of their
income for rent, twice HUD's recommended maximum
affordability ratio for total housing costs (30%). One
housing activist in Holyoke familiar with the Department of
Public Welfare's efforts to place AFDC households in rental
housing states that the department's Placement and
Prevention Program is typically placing households in units
that rent for 60 to 90% of their income and, on occasion,
has actually surpassed their monthly income. One landlord
who has a reputation for providing decent units in these
neighborhoods reported that he often has welfare households
paying 80% of their income to rent one of his apartments
(and his rents range only between $375 and $525 per month).
Department of Public Welfare officials in Holyoke report
that there has not been an increase in the payment standards
in three years and do not expect one in the forseeable
future.
This suggests that landlords may be reaching the limits
of their poorest tenants' abilities to pay for decent
housing. It may also explain why the conventional wisdom is
Conversation with Department of Public Welfare supervisor,
July 1991.
54Extrapolated from CACI's 1988 Sourcebook of Demographics.
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to "upgrade" one's holdings or "get out". Renting to
households who are forced to pay 80% of their income is
risky business. Allowing them to double and triple-up only
adds to the maintenance costs and defers financial failure
of the property. Unless one can rent to those at least
slightly higher on the income scale, there is little hope
for improving cash flow.
There is nothing new in this situation. If anything it
is just getting a little bit worse. What is strange is that
for over 10 years, investors have been buying and running
these rental properties with negative cash flows while still
making a profit. They have been riding
substitutes that are now gone. No longer will banks allow
investors in low-grade rental housing to cover their
operating losses or pad their profits with refinancing
proceeds. No longer will the federal government allow
individual investors to reap tax benefits from their passive
losses in real estate. No longer can investors compensate
for their operating losses with generous gains-on-sale.
They have already fully exploited the increased household
income and desperate housing needs of a displaced immigrant
group. No longer can they expect to find expanding
government housing programs with operating subsidies. And
for those buildings suffering from decades of deferred
maintenance, investors can no longer expect to collect rent
without paying for repairs (even were the courts to allow
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it). Forced to operate on a strictly cash basis, rental
properties at the lowest end of the rental market cannot
support a significant portion of the households at the
lowest end of the income scale.
Investors are responding to this economic reality by
finding a way to upgrade their properties or to get rid of
them. Some are trying to gauge the likelihood of one
neighborhood "making it" and another "being lost".
Returning to the old adage of real estate investment, these
investors report their three most important investment
criteria as "location, location, and location". Investors
seek buildings where the surrounding neighborhood will not
"scare away good tenants". They believe that there are
still some opportunities for the investor who buys wisely in
a good location and is able to "clean-up" the property
successfully. But the emphasis here is to move up in the
market to a higher grade of apartments in which the tenants
will be better able to afford the costs of their own
housing.
Olde Holyoke Development Corporation
This philosophy is nothing new to the non-profit housing
development corporation, Olde Holyoke Development
Corporation (OHDC) in Ward One. Although nominally a non-
profit corporation, this organization strictly observes the
bottom line in its real estate activities. Eschewing
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operating subsidies for their apartments while at the same
time imposing strict minimum income requirements for
tenants, OHDC's units are designed to operate at the lowest
possible market cost. At $400 per month with a 40'. of
income minimum, they are largely unaffordable to AFDC
recipients, even while charging some of the lowest rents in
the City. Their Director, Dick Courchesne, has no
apologies, however.
Holyoke has a high number of subsidized units and it
shouldn't be criticized for failing to provide more
subsidized housing to the very poor. When people start
demanding that Holyoke do more, I ask them, 'What about
Chicopee across the river? Why can't they contribute a
little?' They say that Chicopee doesn't have the
number of poor people that Holyoke has and I tell them
that if they provided more opportunities for poor
people in Chicopee, then they would move there too.
Holyoke does have a high percentage of subsidized units,
second only to Boston in the State. However, it also has
one of the highest percentages of AFDC recipients without
subsidized housing. According to DPW officials, few of
these households live in OHDC's Ward One neighborhood.
As the lead housing developer for the City for over 15
years, OHDC is likely to have a significant role in the
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future of the City's housing policy. Their efforts to
rehabilitate Ward One are widely regarded as successful and
although that review is by no means unanimous, most business
and government leaders with whom I spoke were impressed with
its work. Even those who have been distressed in the past
by the widespread demolition and displacement that OHDC
caused in Ward One are expressing reluctant interest in the
OHDC model. One affordable housing developer told me that
housing sponsors are increasingly asking him to find ways to
structure deals without using operating subsidies, like
OHDC. In the new era of rent-driven rental property
investment, the OHDC model may become an important part of
Holyoke's strategy, as the model for how Holyoke's housing
problems should be dealt with.
Efficient, cost-effective and unburdened by speculative
profit-seeking, OHDC is seen as the cheapest way to provide
affordable housing to the greatest number of residents. It
is often contrasted with the development efforts of Nueva
Esperanza, Inc. (NEI) in South Holyoke with which it
competes for scarce CDBG funds. NEI, in contrast to OHDC,
funds nearly all its properties with state and federal
operating subsidies. The search for housing solutions in
the newest of Holyoke's blighted neighborhoods-- Churchill--
has already led to the development of some OHDC properties
there. We have already seen what NEI's response has been in
the example of 558 South Summer St. What follows is a brief
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discussion of the OHDC model and how it has responded, in
its way, to a failed rental property in its local Ward One.
OHDC began as a model cities program in the 1970's.
Their initial strategy was to start at the perimeter of Ward
One and work toward the center. At first they were able to
buy buildings at less than $3,000 per unit. By the time
they got to the middle, prices were almost $30,000 per unit
and they were unable to afford them. Though the buildings
that remained were more expensive, they were in worse
physical condition in many instances and held a number of
"bad" tenants who were causing problems for the
neighborhood, according to Courchesne. One of the Omni
buildings discussed in Chapter 5 belonged to this group. It
sat right next to one of OHDC's previously rehabbed rental
properties and the deteriorated condition combined with the
bad tenants was a source of irritation to OHDC and its
tenants. When the Bank of New England foreclosed and
brought it to auction, OHDC decided to buy it without
knowing how they would eventually rehab it.
The building came with tenants which is not how OHDC
normally likes to buy a building, due to expensive and
restrictive tenant relocation laws. "We'd rather spend our
money on fixing the building than moving the tenants
around," said Courchesne. Since they had no specific plans
to begin rehab, they were under no such obligation. The bad
tenants were consequently evicted for on-premises drug
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possession arrests or non-payment of rent. The "good"
tenants were offered better units at equal or better rents.
Now the building sits boarded up and is kept secure. "It's
being landbanked. There are no current plans for
development. We're waiting for an opportunity like
Cranston-Gonzalez or something. There will always be some
kind of housing program. It's just a matter of waiting for
the right opportunity."
That meant OHDC had to put up $156,000, then manage the
buildings with virtually no rent for almost a year while
they waited for the tenants to leave. Do the existing
properties throw off enough cash that OHDC can use the extra
income to capitalize such projects? No, according to
Courchesne there isn't that much cash from these properties.
They have good reserves and the rents are kept at the
minimum, around $400 per month. The capital for projects
like these comes not from other housing projects, but from
outside contracts. OHDC has a lucrative sideline doing
inspections, drafting and design work for banks and other
clients. This income is the major source of their
capitalization fund.
Though they have no idea where the money will eventually
come from for the Omni building, they have a history of
getting things done with very little expense. Though large
projects funded by major programs constrain the amount of
cost-cutting that is possible, the philosophy at OHDC is to
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"use every legal means to dodge every legal roadblock" that
costs money. "Currently we can put up a two-family for
under $100,000 in construction costs. That's because so
much of the costs are in-house-- legal (Courchesne is a
lawyer), design, drafting, marketing, construction
management and development.
Another reason why they can charge projects and tenants
such low costs is the administrative support they get each
year from the city. As administrator for a number of city
programs, and as beneficiary of a large commitment of CDBG
funds each year, OHDC's staff need not charge all their
expenses to the individual project. For instance, if this
subsidy was not in place, the rents of their units would
have to rise an average of 15 - 20'. ."
But things have changed, according to Courchesne, and it
is no longer possible for OHDC to do the kinds of projects
it once did. The acquisition prices of the units on the
market put the rehabbed price of a property well above what
a potential tenant or home buyer would be willing to spend
in this neighborhood.
"In 1978 we bought two single family homes and an eight
unit block for $17,000. We did some moderate rehab and
""Though this is a kind of operating subsidy, it amounts to
only a fraction of the average Massachusetts Chap. 707 operating
subsidy of $500 per unit, typical of NEI's properties.
ill
sold the single-families for $10,000 a piece. We then
got them into a low interest, home improvement loan
program where they borrowed $10,000 more for each unit
and finished the rehab job themselves. The large
apartment block was then rehabbed for only $10,000 per
unit. But you can't do that any more."
Not only are the units more expensive, complained
Courchesne, they are in worse condition. There were other
Omni properties that had also been up for auction in the
same neighborhood but the price that the bank wanted had
been too great. In one case, the back taxes equalled
$70,000 and the building's condition was such that it might
have required demolition at a cost of $130,000. $200,000
was too much for an empty lot, according to Courchesne. In
the case of the one building that they did buy, they paid
$9,000 per unit for a building that they expected would cost
over $15,000 per unit to repair.
But capital costs were only one of the factors limiting
development of affordable housing at OHDC, according to
Courchesne. In addition to the high costs of acquisition
and rehabilitation, there are now a plethora of regulations
"The bank was holding a mortgage balance of $22,000 per
unit. According to Courchesne, "The bank had no idea what was
going on. They didn't know what the property was worth until the
day of the auction. I never thought that these properties were
worth $22,000, but somehow Omni managed to get a mortgage."
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homeownership, they have made Ward One a more peaceful and
prosperous looking neighborhood. To the extent that the
solution to Holyoke's housing problems are founded on the
economic principle that residents should pay their own way;
that the exclusion of under-income residents, who form a
significant part of the existing community, is a necessary
step toward neighborhood improvement, then efforts to
improve Holyoke will lead to increasing displacement.
On the other hand, one cannot ignore the way that OHDC
has come to replace the private, for-profit developer as a
source of moderately-priced housing. Private investors who
do not have the benefit of OHDC's sophisticated development
skills, their CDBG funds, City-donated properties, non-
profit status and government subsidized loans will be hard-
pressed to develop and operate their properties at nearly
what it costs OHDC. At a time of shrinking commitments to
subsidized housing, especially in Massachusetts, the
efficient use of government funds to create even moderately-
priced housing cannot be overlooked.
In this chapter we have seen how three major players have
responded to the current crisis. Lenders are committed
whether they like it or not. They are waiting and hoping
that the market will somehow improve. Private investors are
choosing to drop-out of the low-grade rental housing market
by either up-grading or abandoning their properties to the
banks. The City's lead housing agency is committed to an
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upgrading program that it began nearly two decades ago.
None of these trends holds out much hope for low-income
households. They will likely see fewer housing
opportunities and increasing marginalization if these trends
continue.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
The recent transition from marginal profit-making to
cash-driven financial management of low-grade rental
properties has had and will continue to have a severe impact
on the future of those properties and of the households who
live in them. We have seen how the crisis in Holyoke's low-
grade rental properties began long before the speculative
boom of the 1980's.
We have seen how successful rental property investment
for the small investor traditionally depended on hands-on
management, close ties with the tenants, and minimizing
turnovers through competitive rents and reliable (although
minimal) service. We saw how tenants in these buildings
paid relatively little of their income toward rent during
the post-war years while the rent that they paid allowed the
landlord a generous return on his investment. Meanwhile,
tenants were abandoning these aging buildings in favor of
the suburbs. Vacancies were rising and it was becoming
harder and harder to attract tenants.
This changed, however, in the late 1960's as low-income
households, seeking housing and job opportunites unavailable
elsewhere, came to Holyoke. This trend grew through the
1970's and into the 1980's. Increasingly desperate for
housing, they were willing to pay high proportions of their
income for rent. They would double and triple-up their
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households and suddenly units that were going for well under
the market rent to a long term tenant, were being rented to
these new immigrant households for much more.
During the 1970's prices escalated for many things but
especially for the cost of providing rental housing. From
fuel costs to waste disposal to fire insurance, fixed
housing-related costs were rising well ahead of inflation.
The maintenance costs rose steeply as 30 children inhabited
aging buildings where for years only a dozen children had
lived. Increasing costs, new legal obligations and the
deteriorating incomes of renters who were supposed to pay
for them, led many small investors to get out. The City's
de facto policy of destroying low-grade rental housing (in
keeping with the national trend) did tighten up the market,
however.
Tax benefits and credit opportunities were expanded
briefly in the 1980's. Property values rose sharply.
Investors with incomes to shelter and a knowledge of
mortgage financing responded by purchasing properties with
little attention to their use as shelter for tenants. The
loss of those tax incentives and the collapse of the credit
markets has recently returned investors to dependency on
their tenants' income for operating income. In the
meantime, that income has only further eroded and the
increased debt burden has made these properties financially
unfeasible. The investors are pulling out in one way or
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another and the original investors they bought from are
unlikely to return.
The "safety net" of state-sponsored housing assistance is
currently being unraveled and the threat of homelessness,
despite the high vacancy rates, grows every day.
Shelter by Ballot
The traditional market arrangements that allowed the
tenant to use a part of the household income in exchange for
a decent place to live no longer function for those
households with lower incomes. For a while a strange set of
arrangements made it possible for those properties to earn
income independently of their tenants' income, but that is
over now. In its wake we will see a long period of
adjustments as investors and their lenders (and the
taxpayers who insured them) take their losses. Meanwhile
some buildings will be lost and tenants will be squeezed
even more tightly. As investors seek to control their
costs, they are looking for ways to get out of the low-grade
rental market altogether. In the opinions of many
investors, it will be those landlords who can successfully
market to a higher income household who will make it out of
this current crisis.
If housing for the poor is infeasible, at least in the
short run, without government subsidies, then tenants must
increasingly see their housing as a political benefit to be
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won through political means. To be poor and independent of
public subsidies is, increasingly, to live in substandard
housing. Part of the new social relationship necessary to
the survival of housing opportunities for the poor must be
the tenants' political organization, built on the
realization that decent housing is built with votes as much
as bricks and mortar.
Along with this politicization there must come a new set
of relationships between landlord and tenant.
The Seeds of Change
Broadly speaking, the seeds for that change have already
been sown. As Nueva Esperanza and OHDC move into these
neighborhoods; as tenants of publicly-subsidized properties
assume tenant ownership; as the courts increasingly move to
protect the welfare of lower-income tenants; as political
leaders increasingly hold landlords responsible for the
activities of their tenants, we may see that ownership of
low-grade rental housing may change from "proprietor" to
"steward". With more emphasis on providing a service than
managing a personal asset, these properties may increasingly
fall into the hands of non-profits and quasi-public
institutions, accountable to the community at large.
Informal conventions that once served to regulate the
tenant/landlord relationship in the past (and have since
disappeared) may be replaced with more formal ones. From
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mediation services in the courts to housekeeping trainings
provided by landlords, to on-site daycare services, group
counseling and referral services; from tenant-advisory
councils screening applicants and reviewing evictions to
revising lease provisions; from co-ops, condos, and co-
housing to land trusts, mutual housing associations and non-
profit or tenant-owned rentals-- in many ways the new
tenant/landlord relationship may be redefined.
The opportunities for speculative gain on these
properties may be reduced or erased as communities seek to
provide lasting opportunities for affordable housing. The
struggles of the small, for-profit landlord hit with hard
times may increasingly be ignored by policy-makers and
housing judges who see little to be gained by bailing out a
profit-seeking landlord when there are non-profit
alternatives available. These non-profits, as they
demonstrate their viability and commitment to the community
may be seen as the only "legitimate" owners (or stewards) of
such properties. These and other public/private
partnerships will blur the distinction between public and
private housing.
The community-based housing organization, like NEI, can
provide more than a conduit for redistributive aid. As
landlord, these organizations often have an office within
easy walking distance of their tenants. Board members are
likely to include some tenants. The natural intimacy that
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occurs when owners closely manage their properties
reinforces the community development goals of the
organizaiton. Self-help and leadership development programs
are easier to organize when one has a personal relationship
with the participants, especially within a context that
includes family, neighbors and friends. Conversely, tenants
who participate in such programs may be encouraged to
develop positive relationships with their neighbors and take
more care with the building in which they live. Under these
new terms, one's civic duties may include stopping the
graffiti in the hallway.
NEI's property management office is on South Summer
Street, in one of the residential buildings. Managers
explain to the new tenants that an important aspect of their
new tenancy is an unwritten obligation to improve the life
of the community. They are told that NEI could only offer
these apartments becaus community members pitched in to
help.
Another technique which NEI's managers employ is the
tenant advisory meeting. All newly occupied buildings hold
their first meeting during the first month. The tenants at
that meeting discuss what they expect from their neighbors.
The title of the discussion is taken from the initial
question put to the group (sometimes it is the only
question), "What is a good neighbor?" The result is a
clearly communicated set of expectations that forms the
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foundation of a new set of "traditions" for life in these
apartment blocks.
The public nature of the "good neighbor" discussion
reinforces mutual accountability. For example, tenants
often refer to the list of self-written rules when they
complain to each other and the manger uses the same rules
when mediating disputes between neighbors.
Perhaps the most important contribution provided by these
community-based organizations is their recreation of the
traditional commitment made by the owners of rental property
to the shelter needs of their residents. By their very
definition they have undertaken that commitment. If they
fail to live by it then there is recourse to force them back
to it.
The de-privatization of low-grade rental housing need not
improve housing opportunities for lower-income households,
however. The OHDC model could worsen opportunities for
those with the lowest incomes. The community-based, NEI
model has proven that it can help this part of the
population, but only so long as the political will and the
economic means remain to transfer wealth into operating
subsidies to finance it. Without public financial support,
these community-based organizations face the same impossible
struggle as any other owner of low-grade rental housing.
For without some redistributive effort to equalize incomes
and wealth in this nation, the "invisible hand" of the
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market is unlikely to do any more than push the low-income
renter to the very edges of society.
Aside from this critical commitment to redistribution,
there may be some steps that local policy-makers could
implement to reweave a social fabric back into these
properties and their neighborhoods:
(1) Create incentives for owner-occupancy. Local
officials have control over tax rates, tax foreclosure
proceedings, block grant funds, housing improvement grants
and low-interest loan pools, and fees for city services. In
Holyoke and some other cities the utility company is
publicly-owned. If owner-occupants have access to lower
rates, better services, and priority access to foreclosed
buildings, they may be able to improve their cash-flow
enough to make investment attractive.
(2) Create and subsidize an owner-occupant rental housing
association with pooled legal and administrative services
that are provided to members at a price well below the
market.
(3) Establish, perhaps through the organization above, a
training program capable of turning out relatively
sophisticated owner-occupants capable of understanding and
using modern property management techniques.
(4) Establish a loan pool specifically directed at owner-
occupant acquisitions of properties.
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(5) Establish neighborhood block groups which have real
input into certain political decisions-- like land-use
planning, traffic control, or infrastructure improvements.
The key here is to encourage involvement by making it clear
that those who do not become involved have something to
lose.
Whatever happens, however, the status quo seems very
unstable and the future is sure to be dynamic, to say the
least. The increasing liabilities facing rental property
owners, a sluggish recovery from the current recession, and
a lack of new government aid in the forseeable future
suggests that the small investor will continue to face even
harder times before they are likely to improve. Without
strong intervention,- this social resource is lkely to be
lost and the the security of millions of low-income renters
put in jeopardy.
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